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PAINTING A MOVING TRAIN: ADDING 
"POSTMODERN" TO THE TAXONOMY OF LAW 
Adam G. Todd* 
1. IN1RODUCTION 
IN literature, the visual arts, architecture, and other disciplines, the word "postmodem" is applied as a label to certain products emerging from both 
the period and philosophical movements of the postmodem era. l For example, in 
literary scholarship, there are references to "the postmodem novel"; 2 in 
architecture, certain buildings are called "postmodem." 3 While such a 
designation in literature is rather commonplace, in law there appears to be no 
comparable use of the term postmodem as a label. Despite the growth of the 
"law and literature" movement, which examines the law as literature,4 laws are 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author would 
like to thank his wife, Cynthia Richards, and his children" Lily and Samuel for their support and 
patience while this article was written. He would like to also thank Richard Bales and Linda 
Edwards for their early support and Dionne Koller, Margaret Johnson, Keith Blair, James Kelly, & 
Amy Dillard for their comments and eneouragement on this article. 
I. See, e.g., Hans Bertens, The Postmodern Weltanschauung and Its Relation to Modernism: 
An Introductory Survey, in A POSTMODERN READER 25, 28-34 (Joseph Natoli & Linda Hutcheon 
eds., 1993) (discussing the use of the term 'post-modernism' between 1934 and 1964); Roger 
Copeland, Postmodern Dance, Postmodern Architecture, Postmodemism, 7 PERF. ARTS 1. 27, 28 
(1983) (comparing postmodern architecture to postmodern movements in dance); John F. Nivala, 
The Architecture of a Lawyer's Operation: Learning from Frank Lloyd Wright, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 
99, 104-05 (1996) (stating that, like the architectural concepts of Frank Lloyd Wright, lawyers 
should not be formulaic in the application oflegal principles to specific situations). 
2. See, e.g., RAYMOl';U LESLIE WILLIAMS, THE POSTMODERN NOVEL IN LATIN AMERICA: 
POLITICS OF CULTURE, Arm THE CRISIS OF TRUTH at v (1st ed., 1995) ("The subject of this book is 
the postmodern novel in Spanish America .... "); Jacqueline Foertsch, Introduction: The Terror! 
The Terror!, 36 STl;TIIES IN THE NOVEL 285, 288 (2004) ("Has the postmodern novelist of the 
subject of terror fared any better than the contemporary journalist?"); Postmodemism and the 
Postmodern Novel, The Electronic Labyrinth, http://elab.eserver.org!hfl0256.html (last visited Oct. 
30,2008). 
3. See CHARLES JENCKS, THE NEW PARADIGM IN ARCHITECTURE: THE LANGUAGE OF 
POSTMODERNISM 57-96 (2002). See also P. Stuart Robinson, Individualism, Identity, and 
Community in Globalizing Postmodern SOCiety, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE 'THIRD 
DEBATE' 165, 170 (Darryl S.L. Jarvis ed., 2002) (discussing the rise of postmodern architecture in 
reaction to "looming featureless high-rise buildings"). 
4. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVE~1ENTS: LAW AND JL'RISPRUDENCE AT 
CENTURY'S El'<'U 149-66 (1995). 
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rarely identified as postmodem.5 This article proposes that there are laws that tit 
the characteristics of post modernism and can aptly be labeled postmodem. 
While the postmodem characteristics of these laws allow for a certain level 
of "regulation," the postmodem ontological uncertainty and indeterminate 
qualities of these laws make them inapposite.6 Laws that carry such a label are 
ultimately undesirable in a legal system based on normative and positivist 
principles.7 When the subject matter of the law is in a signiticant state of flux, 
however, a postmodem law can play a useful and transitory role in regulation. 
Once the subject becomes more stable, modem laws that are or at least aspire to 
be certain, clear, and normative can be implemented, supplanting the postmodem 
laws. 
The term postmodemism elicits reactions ranging from adulation to anger 
from scholars and other members of the legal profession.8 It is a rather cumber-
some, abstruse, and affected term that has meant a broad range of things to many 
different people.9 Postmodemism historically resisted and rejected the modernist 
act of creating a single definition. 1O This lack of a single definition of post-
5. But see Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship 
and Judicial Practice (with an Emphasis on the Teague Rule against New Rules in Habeas Corpus 
Cases), 88 Nw. U. L REv. 1046, 1054-55 (1994) (describing a Supreme Court decision as 
postmodern and as using postmodern interpretive tools applied by scholars). 
6. See Bertens, supra note 1, at 64. 
7. See, e.g., LON L FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 58 (rev. ed. 1977) (arguing that criminal 
laws that create a high degree of uncertainty as applied to a specific situation should be declared 
void); John Gardner, The Legality of Law, 17 RAno JURIS 168, 180-81 (2004) ("Anyone who 
hasn't picked up that legal norms ought to be open, prospective, clear, etc. hasn't fully understood 
the genre."). See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and },10rals, 71 
HARV. L REv. 593 (1958) (defending the positivist principles against critics who claim that they do 
not resolve legal issues falling outside the settled meaning of the law), reprinted in ESSAYS fN 
JeRISPRUDENCEAND PHILOSOPHY 49 (1983). 
8. See Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional 
"Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L REV. 461, 461 (1997); Stephen M. Feldman, An Arrow 
to the Heart: The Love and Death of Postmodern Legal Scholarship. 54 V AND. L. REv. 2351, 2357 
(2001). See also Arthur Austin, A Primer on Deconstruction's "Rhapsody of Word-Plays," 71 
N.C. L. REv. 201, 235 (1992) (describing deconstructionism as '''mean[ing] nothing and 
establish[ing] nothing"') (quoting ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL 
CRlTIQliE 93 (1990». 
9. See DARRYL S.L. JARVIS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
POSTMODERNISM 128 (2000) ("[Postmodem theories] are imagined and fictitious enemies, 
theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most 
people .... "); Arrow, supra note 8, at 463-74; Douglas Litowitz, Postmodernism Without the 
'Pomobabble,' 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 41, 41-76 (2000). 
10. See Reza Dibadj, Postmodemism, Representation, Law, 29 U. HAW. L. REv. 377, 379 
(2007); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory 
Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REy. 2505, 2508 (1992). See also Dale Jamieson, The Poverty ()f 
Postmodernist TheOJY, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 577, 577-78 (1991) (defining postmodemism in 
relation to modernism). Stephen Feldman specifically avoids defining postmodernism, stating: "A 
proffered definition for postmodernism would appear to reduce it to some fundamental core or 
essence. which would be too foundationalist, too essentialist-too modernist." STEPHEN M. 
FELDMAN, AMERlCk'l LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODEITh'1SM TO POSTMODERNISM; AN 
INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 38 (2000). 
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modernism is particularly problematic in the legal context. 11 Over the past 
decade, however, a general sense of agreement has developed about what is 
meant by the term postmodemism. 12 This generalized consensus, particularly 
among legal scholars, now allows this tenn to function as a label in legal 
contexts, much like it is used in other disciplines. 
The term applies to laws that have postmodem traits that make them 
uncertain, fragmented, and subject to multiple interpretations. 13 The characteri-
zation of a certain law as postmodern has the paradoxical modernist effect of 
reducing--or "normalizing"-what is otherwise uncertain law.14 More practi-
cally, this labeling, which is a modernist act, creates a pragmatic, normative tool 
for bridging the postmodern and modern.15 A shared dialogue can emerge where 
the new form of postmodern law can be identified, appreciated, critiqued, and 
placed in a historical context. Further, the term postmodem can add to the 
taxonomy of law by helping practitioners and scholars categorize, define, and 
better understand the law. 
The use of postmodern as a label also establishes that the concept of 
postmodernism is alive at a time when a surprising number of people call it dead 
or passe. 16 The term postmodern and the theories associated with postmodemism 
are far too entrenched in the law's lexicon and literature to appropriately call 
postmodernism "dead" in any way, and its continued power and Ubiquity in 
writing, both in and outside of the legal environment, show that it cannot be 
deemed passe by any stretch of the imagination. 17 Moreover, the descriptive 
power of the label postmodem and its apt characterization of certain laws 
demonstrate the continuing relevancy of the term and ideas connected to 
postmodernism.1 8 
11. See Emily L. Sherwin, Legal Ta'Conomy 16 (Cornell La~ Sch., Research Paper No. 06-020, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925129. Sherwin discusses the importance of 
classifYing laws in order to assist courts and to aid in the communication oflegal ideas. !d at 16-
22. The inability to provide a single definition of postmodemism interferes with this concept. fd. 
12. See FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 137; JURISPRUDENCE: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: 
FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNlSM 462-63 (Robert L. Hayman, Jr. et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
13. Feldman, supra note 5, at 1060. 
14. fd. at 1071 n.126. 
15. fd. at 1064. 
16. See 'TERRY EAGLETON, AFTER THEORY 24-25 (2004) (arguing that postmodern theory is no 
longer relevant); Katherine C. Sheehan, Caring for Deconstruction, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 85, 
89 (2000) (citing JEFFREY T. NEALON, DOUBLE READING: POSTMODERNlSM AFTER DECONSTRUCTION 
22 (1993») ("It is not entirely clear why ... disapproving feminists bother to concern themselves 
with postrnodernism or deconstruction at all, much less to attack them with the vehemence 
sometimes displayed. The fashion these days is to consider deconstruction, at least, a thing of the 
past .... "); Glen Scott Allen, Baptismal Eulogies: Reconstructing Deconstruction from the Ashes, 
POSTMODERN CULTURE, Jan. 1993, http://www.iath.virginia.edu/pmc/text-onlylissue.193/revicw-
7.193 (analyzing the demise of deconstructionism through analogy to a burial). See also Adam 
Todd, Neither Dead nor Dangerous: Postmodernism and the Teaching 0..1 Legal Writing, 58 
BAYLOR L. REv. 893, 944 (2006) (arguing that postmodernism has become commonplace in the 
legal academy and particularly in legal writing pedagogy). 
17. Dibadj, supra note 10, at 379; Todd, supra note 16, at 895. 
18. Dibadj, supra note 10, at 406. 
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In this article, the label of postmodern is applied, as an example, to the 
United States-European Union Safe Harbor Agreement ("Safe Harbor 
Agreement") that relates to the European Union ("E.U.") Privacy Directive. 19 By 
viewing the Safe Harbor Agreement as a postmodem law, the weaknesses of the 
law from a modernist perspective are highlighted, while from a postmodernist 
and pragmatic perspective, its strengths can be appreciated. 
As a second example, this article applies the label to computer code that 
some scholars deem a form of law.2o Labeling the code postmodern highlights 
this "law's" ontological unc~rtainty and illusiveness under more traditional and 
modern definitions oflaw.21 
Postmodern laws are characterized by a paradox; the law is flexible and 
adaptable but simultaneously normative. This paradox makes a postmodern law 
valuable. In the postmodern era of technology and cyberspace, a postmodern law 
such as the Safe Harbor Agreement is likely to be a model for future legal 
regimes that can be flexible, dynamic, evolving, and multifaceted while still 
providin~ for the normative needs of regulation in the emerging global legal 
system. 2 By being postmodern, a law is not nihilistic or illusive, but rather 
pragmatic. Postmodernism allows for there to be a law, and for this law to 
function in a system that, under the rigidity needed under modern formalism, 
would not be otherwise permitted.23 Identifying the label postmodern in this 
legal context and correctly applying it is useful as a conceptual tool and adds to 
the overall taxonomy oflaw. 
Many scholars have lamented that judges for the most part do not read or 
heed what legal scholars write.24 Others claim that the legal profession does not 
19. Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 56,534 (Sept. 19, 2000); Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European 
Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000). See also Safe Harbor Documents, 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_Documents.asp (providing access to the documents that 
"constitute the 'safe harbor' privacy framework that the Department of Commerce has negotiated 
with the European Commission"). 
20. See infra Part V. See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 at 5 (2006) (discussing 
how code "regulates cyperspace as it is"). 
21. See Dean Colby, Conceptualizing the "Digital Divide": Closing the "Gap" by Creating a 
Postmodern Network that Distributes the Productive Power of Speech, 6 COMM. L. & POL'y 123, 
132 (2001). 
22. See Safe Harbor Documents, supra note 19. 
23. See Henry Farrell, Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce-The E. u.-
u.s. Safe Harbor Arrangement, 57 INT'L ORGANIZATION 277, 279-80 (2003); Geirgre Crowder & 
Martin Griffiths, Postmodernism, Value Pluralism, and International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIOKS AKD THE 'THIRD DEBATE,' supra note 3, at 127. See also ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A 
NEW WORLD ORDER 213 (2004) (stating that international relations are achieved through a complex 
global web of "government networks"). 
24. Feldman, supra note 5, at 1087; Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are 
Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,2007, http://se1ect.nytimes.coml2007/03119! 
us/19bar.html; Posting of Peter Lattnlan to Law Blog of Wall Street Journal, 
http://blogs.wsj.comilaw/2007103119/judges-are-ignoring-law-review-articlesI (Mar. 19, 2007, 
09:09 EST). 
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need "high-falutin" theory. 25 To the contrary, postmodernism-at least as 
presented and used in this article-is of vital importance to judges and other 
practitioners of the law. While certainly those practicing law need clarity in 
rules, particularly when the state of an area of the law is in flux, the label of 
postmodern may be the exact guidance needed for the practicing attorney. In this 
context, postmodernism can be taken off the shelves of the pointy-headed 
professors and made part of the practicing bar.26 
II. THE EMERGING CONSENSUS OF THE DEFINITION OF POSTMODERNISM 
Postmodernism is characterized by the idea that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to come up with a clear definition for any term, including the term 
postmodemism. 27 Even though ontological resistance makes postmodemism 
difficult to define, other than this one paradoxical characteristic, postmodernism 
is in fact a definable and substantive doctrine.28 Legal academics generally agree 
on how to define "postmodetnism.,,29 Scholars now recognize that postmo-
demism is most often used in two ways, as a chronological period and as a 
philosophical attitude.30 
A. Chronological Definition of Postmodernism 
The first definition is a description of the particular time period that 
followed the Modem Era. 31 The Modem Era, which encompasses the Age of 
25. FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 197. 
26. As Stephen Feldman states: "[L]eading modernist scholars incorporate postmodern insights 
as instrumental tools in their arguments." Stephen Feldman, Playing with the Pieces: 
Postmodernism in the Lawyer's Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REv. 151, 153 (1999). 
27. This article, like most other articles addressing postmodernism, begins by defining the 
term. "Everyone begins the discussion of postmodernism by asking what the word could possibly 
mean." JOHN MCGOWAN, POSTMODERNISM AND ITS CRITICS, at ix (1991). Stephen Feldman 
specifically avoids defining postmodernism, stating: "A proffered definition for postmodernism 
would appear to reduce it to some fundamental core or essence, which would be too 
foundationalist, too essentialist-too modernist." See FELDl'vtAN, supra note 10, at 38. 
28. There is consistency in the definitions found in articles discussing postmodernism, 
particularly those wTitten in the past few years. See FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 15-28; Dibadj, 
supra note 10, at 378; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Postmodernism, http://plato.stanford. 
edulentties/postmodernisrn! (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
29. FELDMA~, supra note 10, at 38. 
30. See J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1966, 1967-
69 (1992). See also James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? integrity, Postmodernism 
and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REv. 493, 497 (1999) ("[I]t seems useful to distinguish between 
postmodemism as a kind of arch cultural schlick and post-modernism as an earnest 
epistemology."); Michael Donaldson, Some Reservations about Law and Postmodernism, 40 AM. J. 
JURIS. 335, 336 (1995) (stating that postmodernism is best understood "as a description of a time 
period or age; .. , as a methodology, a way of reading texts and interpreting history using a cluster 
of tools[;] ... [and] as something that looks very much like, and occasionally purports to be, a 
descriptive and analytical theory"). 
31. See lhab Hassan, From Postmodernism to Postmodernity The Local/Global Context, 25 
PHIL. & LITER. ... TURE 1, 16 (2001) (pointing out that the term postmodern was used in a number of 
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Enlightenment, the Protestant Refonnation, and the rise of industrialism (and the 
Industrial Age), is characterized as the period when people began relying less on 
tradition and reli~ion and instead turned to science and rational secularism to 
order their lives.} In the Modern Era, as people in Western Europe and other 
emerging areas adjusted to the rise of mercantilism, they moved away from 
agrarian life and experimented with inventive and non-traditional methods of 
expression.33 
Postmodernism followed the Modern Era.34 Unlike the Modern Era,35 when 
western societies adjusted to the use of machines in the home and workplaces, 
the postmodern period is characterized as the period when people are becoming 
accustomed with computers, easily accessible information, and high technology. 
People's disillusionment with the "promise" of modernism also marks this 
period.36 In the postmodern era, people look skeptically upon secularism and 
rationalism, and prefer to infonn and structure their lives through religion and 
tradition.}7 Consequently, products or laws coming out of this period might be 
considered or labeled postmodern.38 For example, laws such as the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act,39 the Financial Services Modernization Act,40 and the 
Safe Harbor Agreement could be called "postmodern law" because they emerged 
during this particular era.41 
instances from as as 1870 and the 19308 before the more recent popular use), available at 
http://www.ihabhassan.comlpostmodernism_toyostmodernity.htm. See also ROBERT ATKINS, ART 
SPEAK: A GUIDE To CONTEMPORARY IDEAS, MOVEMENTS, AND BUZZWORDS, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 
at 118-20 (2d ed. 1997) (crediting Charles Jencks' The Language of Postmodern Architecture as 
one ofthe more recent works to shape and popularize the term postmodernism). 
32. Jurgen Habermas, Modernity Versus Postmodernity, in A POSTMODERN READER, supra 
note 1, at 92-93; The Electronic Labyrinth, Defining Postrnodcrnism, http://\vww2.iath.virginia. 
cdu/elablhfl0242.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (citing a posting of James Morley to the 
Postmodern Culture electronic conference list). See also FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 15-28 
(discussing the three stages of modernism--rationalism, empiricism, and transcendentalism). 
33. See Todd, supra note 16, at 897. 
34. See AMERlCAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 876 (4th ed. 2006). 
35. Peter Senge,Systems, in IMA.GINE: WHAT AMERICA COULD BE IN THE 21ST CEr-.'TURY at 167, 
168 (Marianne Williamson ed., 2000). 
36. Dennis Patterson, PostmodernismlFeminismlLaw, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254,315 (1992). 
37. Ifpostrnodernism is defined as the era following the Modern Era, then this article is being 
written in the postmodern era. 
38. lM. Balkin makes referenee to the use of postrnodernism as a label for or a referent to 
products emerging from the postmodern era. See Balkin, supra note 30, at 1969. 
39. 42 V.S.c. § 2000bb (2000). 
40. See Gramm-Leaeh-Bliley Finaneial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006)). 
41. Some seholars clarifY this distinction by referring to this period of postrnodernism as the 
"era ofpostmodernity." Balkin, supra note 30, at 1968-69. See also FELDlvIAN, supra note 10, at 8-
9 ("[Some] \witers characterize ... modernism as a eultural phenomenon and modernity as a 
particular social, political, and economie arrangement."). 
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B. Philosophical Definition of Postmodernism 
The second way "postmodernism" is defined-and is used in this article-is 
not in reference to an era, but rathcr as a referent to a philosophical movement or 
"attitude,,42 that rejects or at least is deeply skcptical of the foundations of 
modernism.43 Postmodernism distrusts modernism's '''attempts to create large 
scale, totalizing theories in order to explain social phenomena. ",44 
Postmodernism posits itself in defiance of modernism. Modernism 
represents a time when reason and objective science supplanted tradition and 
authority.45 It is credited with the rise of mercantilism, industrialization, and the 
market system.46 Underlying these social movements was modernism's search 
for an "essential core or single truth.,,47 Modernism credits the autonomous and 
rational individual as responsible for finding the ultimate truth for all matters and 
creating meaning and order from the world.48 Postmodernism questions these 
modernist pursuits. 
According to postmodernists, modernism is reductive, "centralized and 
monolithic in its mindset."49 Modernists espouse a "single master or meta 
42. MINDA, supra note 4, at 224. 
43. See Todd, supra note 16, at 898 n.29 ("Sincc postmodernism is essentially defined by its 
rejection of modcrnism, any discussion needs to begin with a clear understanding of the definition 
of modernism. Adding to the confusion is the fact that the term 'modernism' is also difficult to 
define.") (citations omitted). See also Steven L. Winter, Comment, For What It's Worth, 26 LAW 
& SOC'y REV. 789,793 (1992) ("[W]hat postmodernism has to say on contemporary polities is that 
the subject-which is to say, the forces that shape us and constitute us as subjects-is the issue."). 
44. MINDA, supra note 4, at 224 (quoting COASTAS DOUZINAS ET AL., POSTMODERN 
JuruSPRUDENCE: THE LAW OF TEXT IN THE TEXTS OF LAW, at x (1991)). 
45, See Todd, supra note 16, at 898-99, See also The Electronic Labyrinth, Defining 
Postmodernism, supra note 32 ("Modernism is here understood in art and architeeture as the 
project of rejecting tradition in favour of going 'where no man has gone before' or better: to create 
fonns for no other purpose than novelty,"), 
46. See Todd, supra note 16, at 899. See also Daniel M. Warner, To Hell on the Railroads: 
Why Our Technology and Law Encourage a Degrading Culture, 26 TRANSP. L.J. 361, 369-74 
(1999); Joel Mokyr, Mercantilism, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution (presented to 
the Conference in Honor of Eli F. Heckscher Stockholm, May 2003), http://faculty.wcas.north 
western.edu/~jmokyrlstockholm.PDF (examining how the modernist ideas from the Enlightenment 
affected the Industrial Revolution). 
47, Todd, supra note 16, at 899, See also JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERJ, 
CONDITION: A REPORT ON ~'!OWLEDGE 78-79 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans" 1984) 
(1979) (discussing how modern artists attempt "to present the faet that the unpresentable exists"); 
Feldman, supra note 5, at 1048 (noting that modernists "attempt to reduee the meanings of texts to 
an essential core or single truth"). 
48, See FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 15-28; The Electronic Labyrinth, Defining Post-
modernism, supra note 32. 
49. Todd, supra note 16, at 899. See also Peter A. Alces & Cynthia V. Ward, Defending 
Truth, 78 TEX, L. REv. 493, 521-22 (1999) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
BEYO:'ID ALL REASON: THE R.A..DlCAL ASSAULT ON TR\JTH IN AlvlERICAN LAW (1997)) (stating that 
postmodernists "deny the existence of a universal human nature consisting of shared charaeteristics 
(such as the capacity for rational deliberation) around which a progressive society can be 
organized; they also deny the existence of universally valid truths about the proper structure of law 
112 UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
'narratives of truth,'" 50 and that truth is uncovered through "progress or 
development within a linear conception of history.,,51 Postmodernism implies 
that modernism lacks the tools or ability to "grasp the world 'as it really is.,,,52 
Postmodernists deem modernism reductive and too limited in its approach to a 
world that is messy, fragmented, contradictory, and changing. 53 
In resisting and challenging modernism, postmodemists reject a single 
definition of truth. 54 The skepticism toward singular meaning applies to the 
definition of postmodernism as wel1.55 Those studying postmodemism identify 
this embedded paradox as emblematic of postmodernism. 56 Postmodernism 
resists the possibility of its own defmition while simultaneously incorporating 
this resistance into its own definition. 57 This type of paradox characterizes and is 
celebrated by postmodernism, and distinguishes it from modernism.58 
This second definition of postmodernism as a philosophy or an attitude is 
connected to the first chronologically based definition, but the second captures 
the more radical and complex components of postmodernism. 59 The second 
definition is consistent with the way most scholars recognize and define 
postmodernism. 6o Postmodernism in this more philosophical sense helps us 
understand the new patterns of social structures that are emanating in an era of 
high technology.61 It allows for a refined appreciation of the law and jurispru-
dential theory that are in a state of change. 62 
and politics"); Postmodernism, http://www.jahsonic.comIPostModernism.html (last visited Oct. 30, 
2008) (stating that "there is no truth, there are only versions of it"). 
50. Todd, supra note 16, at 899 (quoting LYOTARD, supra note 47, at 47). See also Kathryn 
Abrams, Unity, Narrative and Law, 13 S11JD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 3, 5 (1993) (discussing the 
difficulties of grasping a singular "normative import" from social narratives). See generally 
NARRATIVES OF TRUTH IN ISLAMIC LAW 25-84 (Baudouin Dupret et aL cds., 2008) (examining the 
concept oflegal truth in Muslim societies). 
51. Todd, supra note 16, at 899 (citing FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 15-28; The Electronic 
Labyrinth, Defining Postrnodernism, supra note 32). 
52. MINDA, supra note 4, at 238. 
53. Dibadj, supra note 10, at 378. 
54. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 1048, See also TERRY EAGLETON, THE ILLUSIONS OF 
POS1MODEM1SM, at vii (1996) ("Postrnodernity is a style of thought which is suspicious of classical 
notions of truth, reason, identity and objectivity, of the idea of universal progress or emancipation, 
of single fnuneworks, grand narratives or ultimate grounds of explanation."); PAULINE MARIE 
ROSENAU, POST-MODEfu'lISM AND mE SOCIAL SCIENCES 13 (1992) ("[P]ost-modernists share a 
skepticism about the possibility of truth, reason, and moral universals .... "). 
55. See Todd, supra note 16, at 899 (citing FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 38 (specifically 
avoiding defining postmodemism); Jeunifer Wicke, Postmodern Identity and the Legal Subject, 62 
U. COLO. L. REv. 455, 456 (1991) (discussing the difficulty of defining postmodemism»). 
56. See Wicke, supra note 55, at 456; FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 38. 
57. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 1048 ("[P]ostmodemism denies the possibility of its own 
definition."). 
58. See id. 
59. FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 8-9. 
60, Id. 
61. See Todd, supra note 16, at 901 (citing Balkin, supra note 30, at 1968 ("Postrnodernism is 
a cultural phenomenon that has already happened and that we are only becoming aware of now."); 
Donaldson, supra note 30, at 344; Feldman, supra note 8, at 2370 ("Postmodern culture, in other 
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1. Postmodernism 's Philosophical Impact 
Postmodemism as a philosophical movement has profoundly affected 
academic disciplines 63 ranging from architecture64 to theology. 65 In addition, 
postmodernism and the theories evolving from this "attitude" have significantly 
affected the way members of the legal profession look at the law and legal 
texts.66 Unfortunately, postmodernism, particularly in legal circles, has also been 
denigrated, mocked, and deemed irrelevant at the very time it has been become a 
standard part of the academy.67 
Despite the derision directed at postmodernism and its resistance to 
definition, the act of describing postmodemism as a label with a single definition 
can bridge the divide between postmodern theory and the normative needs of the 
legal profession.68 Such a bridge is particularly useful in the postmodem age, 
when rapidly changing technologies and social change exceed the normative 
limitations of the law, necessitating a more fluid and flexible paradigm.69 
Some scholars who attack postmodernism blame postmodernism for the 
decline in modernist and normative viewpoints of the law in the contemporary 
legal academy.70 To the contrary, Gary Minda aptly points out that postmodern-
words, permeates all aspeets of our lives, induding the writing of theory."); Litowitz, supra note 9, 
at 40). 
62. See Balkin, supra note 30, at 1969. See also Adam G. Todd, Fractured Freedoms: The 
United States' Postmodern Approach to Protecting Privacy, AMERICA •. '! f'REEDOMS, AMERICAN 
(Drs)ORDERS (Proe. of Polish Ass'n of Am. Stud. 2004 Conf., Warsaw, Pol.) at 2 (diseussing how 
postmodernism can "provide greater insights into the strengths and problems of the United States' 
approach to privacy protection), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlso13ipapers.cfm?abstract~id 
=892874. 
63. See FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 162-63 ("The movement from modernism to 
postmodernism represents a broad cultural, social, and politieal transformation that itself transcends 
disciplinary boundaries, touching most if not all academic fields.") (citing CORMAC MCCARTHY, 
ALL THE PRETTY HORSES 239 (1992». 
64. See generally HEINRICH KLOTZ, HISTORY OF POST-MODERN ARCHlTECTIJRE (Radtka 
Donnell trans., 1988) (discussing the postmodemist movement in architccture). 
65. See generally CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO POSTMODERN THEOLOGY (Kevin 1. Vanhoozer 
ed., 2003) (examining the concept of postmodemism in relation to the absolutist concepts presented 
in theology). 
66. See Donaldson, supra note 30, at 337; Franees J. Mootz III, Postmodern Constitutionalism 
as Materialism, 91 MICH. L. REv. 515, 520 (1992). 
67. See generally Arrow, supra note 8, at 461 (prcsenting a legal parody of postmodern 
themes). See also Austin, supra note 8, at 202-03 ("There is, however, one problem [with 
deconstructionism]: Applied to law, deconstruetion is mischievous nonsense."). But see Feldman, 
supra note 8, at 2352 ("The criticisms of postmodernism are unpersuasive because the modernist 
depiction of post modem legal thought is seriously inaccurate."). 
68. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 1093 (indicating that judges and attorneys "primarily want 
nonnative arguments to apply instrumentally to their practices"). 
69. Some European aeademics see postmodemism as providing promise for a working 
European Union constitution. See, e.g., Marc Glendening, Post-Modernism and the Silent 
Revolution, EUROPEAN J., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 8,10, available at www.democracymovement.org.uk1 
rnainlpdfIMG%20Post-Mod.pdf. 
70. MINDA, supra note 4, at 261 n.12 ("Lehman argues that postmodernism with its 
deconstructive strategies 'is a catastrophe theory inasmuch as it proceeds from the perception of an 
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ism is not responsible; instead, "[pJostmodernists merely point out that a crisis 
and fragmentation exist. Postmodernism ... invites us to see the fluidity of law; 
it is not a theory, but a ~ractice which defines itself in relation to modernist 
aspirations and practices." 1 
2. Pragmatic Versus Nihilistic Postmodernism 
Scholars divide postmodernism into two camps.72 Gary Minda labeled these 
camps as the ironists and the pragmatics.73 Ste~hen Feldman characterized them 
as the anti modernists 74 and the metamodernists. 5 The ironists, or antimodernists, 
completely reject the modernist idea that law might be made coherent by a single, 
comprehensive legal theory. 76 The chief problem with the positions of the 
ironists is that their form of nihilism renders the beneficial normative functions 
that are essential to a meaningful legal system as futile, and hence legal 
scholarship and the legal system itself becomes meaningless.77 Such a position is 
nothing more than "a recipe for inaction.,,78 
In contrast, the pragmatics, or metamodernists, use the tools of 
postmodernism in moderation to advance their scholarship. 79 In this more 
moderate form, postmodernism can be a liberating construction that allows for 
dialogue and action between the rigidity and reductiveness of modernism and the 
fluidity and instability of postmodernism. 8o Postmodemism does not demand 
nihilism, nor does it require a rejection of the ethical and moral foundations of 
modernism. 81 Instead, postmodernism opens possibilities impermissible under 
modernism. It provides flexibility and removes the modernist condition of 
privileging one position over another. 
extreme linguistic instability that undermines the eoherence of any statement .... "') (quoting DAVID 
LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIlv1ES: DECONSTRUCTION AND THE FALL OF PAUL DEMAN (1991)). See 
generally Arrow, supra note 8 (presenting a legal parody of postmodem themes). 
71. MINDA, supra note 4, at 261 n.12. 
72. See id. at 229-32. 
73, See ia. One might also be able to characterize them as the nihilists and the practicalists. 
74. Feldman, supra note 8, at 2374, See also Robert Justin Lipkin, Can American 
Constitutional Law Be Postmodern?, 42 BUFF. L. REv. 317, 332-38 (1994) (describing three 
philosophical camps as nihilism, anarchist pluralism, and postrnodern pragmatism). 
75. See Todd, supra note 16, at 907 & n.81. 
76. See MINDA, supra note 4, at 77. 
77. See Jay P. Moran, Postmodernism's Misguided Place in Legal Scholarship: Chaos Theory, 
Deconstruction, and Some Insights from Thomas Pynchon's Fiction, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 
159 (1997) ("[I]f carried to an extreme, postmodern principles threaten to undermine the Western 
legal system in such a way that return will become unattainable."); Todd, supra note 16, at 907 
n.79 (citing Donaldson, supra note 30, at 344-45) ("What postrnodernism does is deprive us of thc 
ability to determine what right and wrong are, and once this is done, law is without meaning or 
purpose. 
78. MINDA, supra note 4, at 244 (citing Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New 
Social Movement, 26 LAW & SOC'yREV. 697 (1992)). 
79. See Todd, supra note 16, at 907. 
80. Id. 
81. See id. 
Fa112008] LABELING LAW "POSTMODERN" 115 
This article defines postmodernism in the spirit of the pragmatists. A 
pragmatic definition of postmodern is preferable to an ironic definition for two 
reasons. First, a pragmatic approach to postmodemism is consistent with 
postmodernism's embrace of a multiplicity of viewpoints.82 The ironist's fierce 
insistence on a complete rejection of modernism creates a dichotomy between the 
values of modernism and the skeptici sm of postmodernism, disallowing the two 
to exist simultaneously. 83 To be truly postmodern is to question the central 
premise of postmodernism itself.84 Postmodernism should allow for the "promise 
of modernism" while simultaneously questioning modernism.85 The ironist does 
not allow for such a multiplicitude, and instead requires a dichotomous choice of 
either being modernist or postmodernist, but not both.86 
The ironists who espouse a total rej ection of modernism are themselves 
paradoxically engaging in modernist dualism.8? A complete rejection of modern-
ism is antithetical to the postmodernist license for multiplicity.88 Modernism is 
not supplanted by postmodernism,89 but is instead supplemented by it.90 Post-
modernism is flexible enough to incorporate the values of modem and traditional 
norms, partieularly as needed by the law.91 At the same time, postmodernism can 
acknowledge the uncertainty, fluidity, and illusiveness of regulatory norms found 
in the high technology age.92 Being committed to the "Enlightenment" idea of 
progress and seeking normative law is not inconsistent with postmodernism, but 
is subsumed within the polymorphism of postmodernism. 
The second reason in favor of a pragmatic approach to postmodernism is 
that the pragmatic approach is useful to the legal profession while the ironic 
approach is not. Postmodern jurisprudence recognizes that the postmodern anti-
essentialist, deconstructive activity must stop in order "to talk, to communicate, 
to write, etc.,,93 Neopragmatists, like Richard Rorty and Richard A Posner, 
82. See MINDA, supra note 4, at 230. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. 
85. See Patterson, supra note 36, at 315-16. 
86. See MINDA, supra note 4, at 230. 
87. See Todd, supra note 16, at 907. 
88. See Feldman, supra note 8, at 2367. See also Fayaz Chagani, Postmodernism: 
Rean'anging the Furniture 0/ the Universe, IRREVERENCE MAG., 1998, http://www.geocities.com/ 
athens/agora/9095Jpostmodernism.html ("[Postmodernists 1 simply remove the necessity of 
foundations and the necessity of choosing one position over another, allowing us the freedom to 
construct our own positions."). 
89. See Todd, supra note 16, at 907 n.84 ("Modernism sees itself as having replaced or 
supplanted traditionalism and tribalism.") (citations omitted). 
90. See id. at 907. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 180. See also J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the 
Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1613, 1627 (1990); Feldman, supra note 26, at 
151 (stating that postrnodernists "must construct narratives and arguments that use the available 
rhetorical tools or modes of discourse-namely, they must use modernist and postmodemist 
concepts to present their views"). 
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reject modernism's foundational claims for the law, but recognize the nonnative 
needs of society and the value of using the law to resolve problems. 94 
Postmodernism, when used pragmatically, provides tools for dealing with the 
problems arising in the postmodern era.95 Posner argues that the true test of any 
legal analytic is whether it "works" instrumentally in maximizing human goals 
and aspirations.96 Postmodernist laws or labeling laws postmodern can "get the 
job done" better than any other method for uncertain areas of the law.97 When 
subjects of the law are in flux and difficult to regulate through regular nonnative 
means, postmodernism can be a useful tool for creating regulation where none 
would be possible otherwise.98 Thus, postmodern awareness can act as a tool to 
achieve nonnative human purposes.99 
Some claim that this neopragmatic postmodemism (or neopragmatism) is 
not truly postmodemism but only "a close cousin."IOO Some scholars argue that 
neopragmatism is not postmodernism because neopragmatists work to "reveal[] 
instrumental, empirical, and epidemiological solutions for the problem at 
hand."IOI Neopragmatist scholar Pierre Schlag argues that the instrumentalism of 
such a neopragmatic argument is merely a modernist attempt to discover a 
foundation for legal analysis.102 But, as mentioned earlier, such antimodernist 
arguments fall into a modernist trap that denies postmodemism's utility in a legal 
context and is ultimately not useful in jurisprudence.lo3 Postmodernism should 
not be seen as a total rejection of all of modernism but rather skepticism, or 
94. Rorty relies on "the ideas of Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Heidegger," and argues that 
investigations of law, like investigations of knowledge or morality, are reflections of our beliefs 
and. social practices. See MINDA, supra note 4, at 229 (eiting JOHN MCGOWAN, POSTh1ODERNISM 
~"ID ITS CRITICS 192 (1991); Schanck, supra note 10, at 2515). Rorty argues that law and 
interpretation of law is grounded in the social and historical and thus any search for truth and 
knowledge are culturally eonditioned. See id. See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND 
THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1980). 
95. Robert Justin Lipkin, Federalism as Balance, 79 Tn. L. REv. 93, 111 n.60 (2004) (citing 
RICHARD RORTY, CONtINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 96-97 (1989)). 
96. MINDA, supra note 4, at 234 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEYIS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 454-69 (1990)). 
97. POSNER, supra note 96, at 460. 
98. Id. at 465-66. 
99. Another neopragmatist, Riehard Posner, makes a similar point when emphasizing the 
search for normative "truth" requires "the eontinual testing and retesting of accepted 'truths,' the 
constant kicking over of saered cows-in short, a commitment to robust and freewheeling inquilY 
with no intellectual quarter asked or given." ld at 466. 
100. MINDA, supra note 4, at 229. 
101. Id. (citing Margaret J. Radin & Frank MicheIrnan, Pragmatism and Poststructuralist 
Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1031-32 (1991)). See also id at 236 (citing 
Pime Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L REv. 1627, 1721 (1991)) ("[I]t is possible to 
reach principled decisions even though there are no right answers."). 
102. Id. at 236 (citing Schlag, supra note 101, at 1721). 
103. Stephen Feldman called this type of argument "postmodern policing" where one 
postmodernist criticizes another postmodernist for, in effect, not being postmodern enough. 
FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 163. 
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questioning, of modernism. Rejection implies a dichotomy that is inconsistent 
with postmodernism.104 
Using the label of postmodern advances the normative purpose of revealing 
solutions to problems of the postmodern era when modernism often appears to be 
failing. 105 Postmodemists recognize that language is socially and culturally 
constructed and therefore inept at allowing for truly objective decisions based 
solely on reason. 106 Objectivity is instead achieved through "agreement or 
consensus about different interpretive practices.,,107 When there is consensus, 
modern law is appropriate. 108 When a consensus is otherwise imgossible, 
postmodernism and the label postmodem may be useful to provide one. 1 
Stephen Feldman makes this same point when he uses the term "postmodern 
normativeness," which he states, "does not lead necessarily to modernist-style 
recommendations for doctrinal or statutory change but nonetheless accentuates 
the potential for self-reflexive participation in the constant construction and 
reconstruction of our contingent and therefore transformable culture.,,110 But, in 
particular circumstances, "postmodern normativeness" can proscribe doctrinal or 
statutory change. III When the subject matter of the law itself is in flux, 
postmodernism provides a different form of normative doctrinal or statutory 
regime.112 
Some may argue that the pragmatic postmodemism identified bX Minda and 
espoused by this article is no different from legal realism. 13 Indeed, 
postmodernism came out of the legal realist movement and a number of legal 
realists are also postrnodernists. 114 The crucial distinction between legal realism 
and postmodernism is that, as a general proposition, legal realism adheres to 
central modernist aspirations of seeking singular truths or narratives for the 
law. I 15 Conversely, postmodernism is continually skeptical of such an enterprise. 
Legal realists recognize indeterminacy in the law,116 but rather than celebrate and 
104. Id. 
105. MfNDA, supra note 4, at 244-46. 




110. FELD~\fAN, supra note 10, at 178-79. 
111. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the 
Wages a/Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL L. REv. 1,50-52 (2003). 
112. See id. 
113. I would like to thank my eolleague Michelle Gilman for raising this point in a diseussion of 
this article. 
114. See Schanek, supra note 10, at 2579. 
115. Jaek Van Doren, Environmental Law and the Regulatory State: Postmodernism Rears Its 
"Ugly" Head?, 13 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 441, 442 (2005). 
116. Legal realists ean be divided between modernist and postmodernist realists. There are also 
"realists" who recognize the availability of multiple, potentially applicable interpretations of a 
given law. It is with such realists that pragmatic postmodernism may in fact be indistinguishable. 
In other words, the pragmatic postmodemism advanced in this artie Ie may simply be the 
postmodern branch or a postmodern part of the legal realist movement. Alternatively, these 
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embrace such indeterminacy, realists lament and seek to create a determinacy or 
certainty through alternative theories or explanations. 1l7 For example, using the 
realist tradition, law and economics theorists claim that economic theory can best 
explain or provide consistency to the law that may be indeterminate under 
traditional formalism. 118 This article, building on the realist tradition but 
consistent with postmodernism, embraces and celebrates the indeterminacy of a 
postmodern law and the benefits that can be reaped from recognizing 
postmodernism in certain contexts. 
Ill. THE PROMISE AND PARADOX OF USING POSTMODERN AS A LABEL 
A. Why a Postmodern Label Works 
The act of creating a label-like the act of defining a word as scholars 
writing about postmodernism are quick to point out-is anti-postmodern.1 19 The 
very idea of a label is reductionist, unitary, and squarely modern. I2O Because 
there is now consensus about the defmition of postmodernism, an identification 
of its characteristics, and an appreciation of its value, products that possess its 
characteristics can be labeled postmodern.121 To be classified as postmodern, 
these products need not stem from the postmodern era, but instead must have 
"certain characteristics that connect them to the underlying philosophy of 
postmodernism.,,122 
Those who argue that the act of labeling is too modernist fall into the same 
modernist traps as those who claim postmodernism cannot be defined. 123 
particular legal realists can be referred to as pragmatic postmodernists. See Gary Minda, Denial: 
Not Just a River in Egypt, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 901, 904 (2001). 
117. Suzanna Sherry. Democracy alld the Death of Knowledge, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1053, 1062 
(2007). 
118. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 24-26 (7th ed. 2007); Morton 1. 
Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905, 905-06 (1980); Arthur 
Allen Leff, Commentary, Economic Analysis of Lmv: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. 
REV. 451, 459 (1974). See generally Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261, 261-79 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999) (discussing the 
psychological and social factors a judge addresses when determining the outcome of a particular 
case). Law and economic theorists also posit that race, sex, and other demographic characteristics 
sometimes have effects on judicial judgments. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein. The 
New Legal Realism, 75 U. Cm. L. REv. 831, 840 (2008). 
119. See Todd, supra note 16, at 902 (citing Feldman, supra note 5, at 1046-48). See also After 
Postmodernism, http://www.focusing.org/apm.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) ("What post-
modemism teaches is not new. Heraclitus said, 'You canuot step into the same river twice' and his 
student added, 'not even once, since there is no same river.' The ancient Eristics showed the 
unreliability oflogic alone."). 
120. In fact, the word "label" often carries a negative conuotation as being "unfair." See 
Cambridge Dictionaries Online, Cambridge University Press, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/ 
define.asp?key=44254&dict=CALD (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
121. See Balkin, supra note 30, at 1969. 
122. Todd, supra note 16, at 900. See also id. at 900 n.41 ("Other disciplines have used the 
term 'postmodem' to label a movement or style within their discipline.") (citations omitted). 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62. 
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Arguing that labeling in the context of taxonomy is inconsistent with 
postmodernism is a position, in itself, reductive, unitary, and modernist in its 
duality. This form of "postmodern policing" creates a dichotomy between 
modernism and postmodernism that is inconsistent with postmodern thought. 124 
Denying postmodernism from incorporating modernist tropes such as labeling is 
asserting that an act is either postmodern or modem, and cannot be both. 125 
In this instance, the act of labeling something postmodern can be both 
modem and postmodern at the same time. 126 Allowing modernism and post-
modernism to "coexist" is a pragmatic approach to postmodernism that prevents 
postmodernism from being nihilistic and useless in a legal context. 127 Through 
the use of labeling, postmodernism can be a constructive tool for appreciatin~ 
and critiquing laws that come out of, and contain, postmodern characteristics. 12 
Identifying a law that possesses these postmodern traits serves to highlight the 
strengths and weaknesses of the labeled law. 129 The law's fragmentation, incon-
sisteney, and flux are identifiable traits that demonstrate the law's boundaries and 
limitations, particularly in contrast to modernist laws and rules. As such, the act 
oflabeling is a positi vist exercise. 130 
The label can act as a taxonomy based on positivist principles that guide 
future practitioners and scholars to understand and improve the law and can 
create a common language for scholars and practitioners. 131 Additionally, 
labeling laws postmodern is particularly useful in areas of the law subject to 
frequent change. Likewise, comparative law, which deals with harmonizing laws 
from different legal systems, is benefited by postmodern laws. 
1. Taxonomy and Creating a Common Language 
As a taxonomical exercise, labeling a law provides guidance for predicting 
the outcomes of adjudication and contributes to knowledge of and discourse 
about the law. 132 Classification is supposed to "contribute to [the] consistency of 
judicial decisions, ensure that like cases are treated alike, add to the stability of 
law, and impose constraint on judges." 133 Taxonomy assists judges and 
practitioners about the boundaries of a given law, quietly guiding but not 
124. This term is used by Feldman, supra note 5, at 1096. I suppose my argument is also a form 
of postmodern policing of the arguments of ironist scholars. 
125. See id. 
126. See id. 
127. See Moran, supra note 77, at 159. 
128. See Farrell, supra note 23, at 279-80. 
129. See id. 
130, Just as positivism sees the law as manufactured according to certain social conventions, a 
"postmodern law" is one that fits the conventions consistent with the philosophy (and often 
concurrently the era) of postmodemism. See Legal Positivism, Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.eduflllegalpos.htm (last visited Oct. 30,2008), 
131. Sherwin, supra note 11, at 14. 
132. fd. at 16. 
133. Id. (citing PETER BIRKS, ENGLlSHPRIVATE LAW, at xlvi, xlviii (2000)). 
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directing the law.134 While "[t]axonomy is not an end in itself,,,]35 labeling 
enriches our understanding of law and legal regime. 136 Further, taxonomy allows 
those in the legal profession to share a common language, communicate with 
each other more efficiently, and create jargon. 137 As stated by one English 
scholar, "Better understanding of law depends upon a sound taxonomy of the 
law.,,138 The addition of post modem to the taxonomy of the law creates a shared 
language to promote communication and legal analysis in an age of high 
technology and globalism. 
Other critics of labeling laws as postmodem often derisively refer to the 
term as "jargon.,,]39 Recently, however, scholars have recognized the usefulness 
of jargon. For example, Gary Minda discusses how in Law Turning Outward, 
Martha Minow stated that "new interdisciplinary movements in law make it 
increasingly difficult for members of the profession to speak together or to speak 
to members of other disciplines.... Minow called for a new 'comprehensible 
discourse' that would allow legal aeademics to enJaage in a publie debate about 
their differences in methodology and outlook."l Similarly, Terrill Pollman 
argues that ;argon is healthy and necessary for the development of professional 
discourse. l4 
The label postmodern can likewise serve as a uniting device, part of a 
"comprehensible discourse,,]42 that allows members of the legal profession, both 
in and outside the academy, to speak to each other and to people in other 
professions (particularly those who also are using the concepts of post-
134. ld. at 17. 
135, [d, at 8. 
136. ld at 22 ("It makes it easier for lawyers to argue effectively about the normative aspects of 
law, for judges to explain their decisions, and for actors to coordinate their activities in response to 
law."). 
137. See generally Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's 
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMPo L. 5 (1997). 
138. Hancoh Dagan, Legal Realism and the Taxonomy of Private Law I (Tel Aviv Univ. Law 
Faculty Papers, Working Paper No. 38, 2006) (citing PETER BIRKS, ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW (2000)), 
available at http://law.bepress.comltaul wps/fp/ art3 81. 
139. See ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN 
INTELLECTCALS' ABCSE OF SCIENCE 14 (1998) (labeling the common traits ofpostmodemist writing 
to be "obscure jargon, implicit rejection of rational thought, [and] abuse of science as metaphor'); 
Richard Dawkins, Postmodernism Disrobed, NATURE, July-Aug. 1998, at 141 (describing one 
psychoanalyst's postmodem writing as "the most brilliant melange of scientific, pseudo-scientific 
and philosophical jargon"). See also the Postmodern Generator, which parodies academic jargon 
through randomly generated text in essay form. Communications from Elsewhere, 
http://www.elsewhere.org/pomo/ (last visited Oct. 30,2008). 
140. MINDA, supra note 4, at 216 (citing Martha Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73 TELOS 79, 
95 (1986». 
141. Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking about Legal 
Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 887, 889 (2002). 
142. See Minow, supra note 140, at 95. See also Pollman, supra note 141, at 916 ("Interpreting 
law, writing law, or practicing law requires unambiguous precision. Thus, one common 
justification for legal jargon is the need to write precisely."). 
Fa112008] LABELING LA W "POST MODERN" 121 
modernism). 143 This label can allow for cross talk between jurisprudential 
thinkers and different academic disciplines. 144 
2. Usefulness in Particular Areas o/the Law 
Postmodernism's "license for flexibility and multiplicity" is particularly 
important in a discipline that is often rigid and inflexible. 14~ Postmodemism 
allows "multiple positions and interpretations to exist simultaneouslr,,146 It also 
"removes the necessity of privileging one position over another.,,14 Identifying 
and labeling this process in the law returns a certain form of normalization and 
"celiainty," at least certainty about uncertainty, into the law. 148 The label is 
particularly useful in areas of the law that are connected to advanced 
technologies where there are "unknown unknowns,,,149 where legal rights are 
vague, and where our understanding of the implications of law and regulation are 
in flux. ISO 
Further, the Bostmodern label can be particularly useful in the taxonomy of 
comparative law. 51 Identifying laws as postmodern is an important tool for the 
comparative lawyer because postmodern theolJ recognizes the cultural 
distinctiveness or relativity of any particular law. IS Comparative law scholars 
argue that conwarative law requires an internal and situational understanding of a 
legal system. l Taken to its extreme, such an argument suggests that compar-
ative law is futile because a particular law of one country can never be properly 
143. See Minow, supra note 140, at 95. 
144. See MINDA, supra note 4, at 252 (noting there is too little cross-talk between the new 
movements and the more traditional jurisprudential thinkers). 
145. Todd, supra note 16, at 907. 
146. Id 
147. Id 
148. Id. at 946. 
149. This phrase refers to a concept used in decision analysis. It gained notoriety by its use by 
former Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld. News Release, Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of 
Defense (Feb. 12, 2002), http://W\\.W.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636. 
ISO. It is in this way that postmodernism most directly conflicts with legal realism. Legal 
realism-while recognizing the indeterminaey, change and flux of the law-laments such a state in 
the law and seeks determinacy through alternative explanations of the law. See MINDA, supra note 
4, at 27. Postrnodernism, in contrast, embraces or even celebrates such indeterminacy. See id at 
225. 
151. See J.H.M. van Erp, European Private Law: Postmodern Dilemmas and Choices towards a 
Method of Adequate Comparative Legal AnalYSiS, ELECTRONIC J. COI\1P. L., Aug. 1999, § 4.1, 
available at http://~'W.ejcl.org/311art31-1.doc. 
152. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Differences and Categories in Us. 
Comparative Law, 46 A'A. J. COI\1P. L. 43, 54 (1998). 
153. E.g, Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the 'Rectification of Names' in 
Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 19,41 (1996) ("Without an understanding of [the] basic 
normative framework governing the perceived nature of personhood within Chinese culture, it is 
impossible to attempt to illuminate concepts within the Chinese legal normative order."). See 
generally AsIAN LAWS THROUGH AUSTRALIAN EYES (Veronica Taylor ed., 1997) (providing studies 
of various Asian jurisprudences from Asian texts to assist legal professionals in understanding 
Asian law). 
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understood by those outside of its system. 154 "It highlights ... one of the 
important insights of the post-modern critique: the cultural distinctiveness and 
internal coherence of any system of legal rules, modes of reasoning, institutions, 
and social practices.,,155 
From this postmodern view, some comparative law scholars have despaired 
the impossibility of transplanting and harmonizing laws between legal 
systems. 156 They attribute this possibility to barriers caused bJ the cultural 
uniqueness and the social and historical context of a nation's law. 1 7 Other, more 
pragmatic comparativists emphasize that a "comparative lawyer who is aware of 
the cultural, social, economic and ideological ties of the law knows sufficient 
[sic] to be able to practice comparative law responsibly.,,158 
A postmodern law may offer a tool to provide harmonization or 
transplantation in a comparative context, which would not otherwise exist under 
modernist paradigms. A law that possesses postmodern attributes would allow 
for the adoption of a foreign legal regime or law that would not otherwise be 
recognized from a modernist perspective. Postmoderuism permits for its 
reception because the received law might serve a very different purpose and be 
perceived in a very different context by the receiving legal system. A 
postmodern law, in such contexts, aids in the harmonization process. Indeed, 
some continental scholars look to postmodernism as a source for creating a 
unified E.U. Constitution. 159 By being a postmodern law, such an E.U. 
Constitution could exist as a legal regime and could simultaneously be 
interpreted and perceived in different ways by the constituent countries. 160 
154. See Ainsworth, supra note 153, at 19-20. 
155. Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis 
of Antitenwism Datamining, 48 B.C. L. REv. 609, 691 (2007). 
156. ESIN OROCO, THE ENIGMA OF COlvlPARATIVE LAW: VARIATIONS ON A THEME FOR THE 
TWENTY-FrRSTCENTURY 37-38 (2004). See also Bignami, supra note 155, at 691 ("Even ifforeign 
law appears to work better, it will never have the same effect in the different social and cultural 
terrain of home.") (citing Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility qf "Legal Transplants, " 4 MAASTRICHT 
1. EUR. & COMPo L. 111, 117 (1997». 
157. OROCO, supra note 156. See also Bignami, supra note 155, at 691 (citing Legrand, supra 
note 156). 
158. van Erp, supra note 151, § 4.3. van Erp further notes; 
The extent of the awareness that ean be expected of comparative lawyers and that must be 
refleeted in their research depends among other things on whether the legal systems that are to 
be compared are closely related to one another or, on the contrary, belong to markedly 
different cultures. In the latter case comparative lawyers should have a deeper awareness of 
cultural differences than in the former case. 
ld. See also Vivian Grosswald Curran, Re-Membering Law in the Internationalizing World, 34 
HOFSTRA L. REv. 93, 93 (2005) (addressing how differences between common and eivil law 
"produce different understandings of legal standards allegedly shared across legal cultures"). 
159. See, e.g., Glendening, supra note 69, at 10. 
160. Nikolai Wenzel, Ideology and Institutional Change: The E. U. Constitution as Reflection of 
Europe's Emergent Pastmodernism 7 (George Mason Univ., Working Paper, 2005), available at 
http://www.pubchoieesoc.org/papers2005lWenzel.pdf.See.e.g .• Glendening.supranote69.atl0 
("The way in which the E.U.-based system operates at present is post-modernism made flesh 
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B. Potential Problems with Labeling Laws Postmodern 
Despite its potential for more modernist and positivist law, the postmodern 
label should provoke unease. It seems counterintuitive that the label of 
postmodern can in fact serve a guiding and positivist function since 
postmodernism is supposed to defY boundaries and eschew constraints. 161 
Indeed, the label of postmodern creates problems for taxonomy. Postmodernism 
is a convergcnce of disparate components and a rejection of the dichotomous 
categorizations found in modernist approaches to thinking of law. 162 The 
postmodern label also complicates categories such as those proposed by scholar 
Ugo Mattei. 163 He proposes a taxonomy dividing laws into three categories: 
(1) professional laws, (2) political laws, and (3) traditional laws. 164 A "postmo-
dern law" would complicate or work against such categorization because it could 
manifest characteristics of all three categories. The label of postmodern, 
however, is not designed to supplant other schemes of taxonomy, but instead 
(and consistently with postmodern philosophy) to supglement these schemes with 
additional ways of examining and explaining the law. 65 
Another challenge of the label is that the idea of a postmodern law is 
inconsistent with modern conceptions of "law.,,166 In The Morality of Law, Lon 
Fuller argues that law is subject to an internal morality consisting of eight 
principles: (1) there must be extant rules promulgated; (2) the rules must be 
made public; (3) the rules must be prospective in effect; (4) the rules must be 
understandable; (5) the rules must be consistent; (6) the rules must not regulate 
conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties; (7) the rules must not be 
because it obscures who is responsible for what."). See also Ulrike Guerot, Europe Could Become 
the First "Post-Modern" Superpower, EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, Fall 2004, http://europeanaffairs.org/ 
currenUssue/2004jaI1l2004jall_36.php4 ("The Union's amorphous nature is not only one of its 
essential features, but also a useful survival strategy. The moment you try to define its 
characteristics and its final aims, you place it in jeopardy, because there is no agreement among 
Europe's governments and citizens on what its future, or even its present, shape should be."); Ugo 
Mattei & Anna di Robilant, The Art and Science of Critical Scholarship: Postmodernism and 
International Style in the Legal Architecture of Europe, 75 TuL. L. REv. 1053, 1057 (2001) 
("Postmodcrnism is a trendy term in legal literature. The metaphor of Europe as an entity to be 
built, and of legal scholarship as a 'building' or a 'city planning' exercise, evokes an analogy 
between the work of a legal scholar and that of an architect."); Andrew Moravcsik, Despotism In 
Brussels? Misreading the European Union, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 2001, http://www.foreign 
affairs.org/200 I 0501 fareviewessay4 772/andrew-moravcsikldespotism-in-brussels-misreading-the-
european-union.html (noting that the trend in the development of the European Union is not 
towards "centralization but consolidation and voluntary adherence to looser 'concentric circles' of 
commitment"). 
161. See Todd, supra note 16, at 907. 
162. See id. 
163. See Mattei, supra note 137, at 16. 
164. Id. at 19. 
165. See Todd, supra note 16, at 907. 
166. See LONL. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (1969). 
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changed so frequently that they cannot be relied upon; and (8) the rules must be 
administered consistent with their language. 167 
According to Fuller, "[a] total failure in anyone of these eight directions 
does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not 
properly called a legal system at a1L,,168 A postmodern law challenges Fuller's 
eight principles because while utterly failing to meet such principles, the law 
does not necessarily result in "a bad system oflaw.,,169 Postmodern law may fail 
under modernist notions and under modernist principles such as those espoused 
by Fuller, but postmodern law may not be considered law at all. Viewing such a 
"law" as postmodern, one can identify, appreciate, and critique its utility. Thus, a 
computer code identified as "postmodern law" can be understood as a law 
inconsistent with modernist notions of law, but still a form of law useful in the 
postmodern era. 
The postmodern label does not connote approbation or disapproval of any 
law so labeledYo Consistent with postmodernism's political agnosticism and the 
positivist agenda, identifying a law as postmodern is politically neutral and 
merely descriptive. l7! It highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of laws 
coming out of the postmodern era. 172 The label allows us to highlight the 
disintegration and fragmentation of modem culture; it is reflective of the 
postmodern condition of the global economy and accompanying legal regime. 
Such a state, however, is at odds with the ultimate normative needs of the 
law. As such, this article asserts that a postmodern law is only useful in a 
normative and positivist sense, when the actual subject of the law is itself in a 
state of flux or is onto logically uncertain. The two examples posited in this 
article, the Safe Harbor Agreement and computer code, currently regulate an area 
in a state of uncertainty, redefinition, and change. Once these postmodern 
characteristics begin to diminish from the subject of these laws, the label 
postmodern becomes less needed and less apt. 
N. CHARACTERISTICS OF POSTMODERN LAW 
In the past ten years, legal scholars have recognized the value of postmodern 
theory and some have associated the term postmodern with particular laws. !73 
167. Id. Fuller argues that law depends on an "inner morality" for its legitimacy. More recent 
scholars have criticized Fuller's theory. See Roy L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-
MAKING FROM LEGAL FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 165-66 (2002) (discussing Fuller's 
criticism of legal positivism and dismissing his criticism as failing to address positivism's "central 
message that law is a system of rules with a certain pedigree; to wit, state-enacted rules held to be 
legitimate by their enforcers"). 
168. fuLLER, supra note 166, at 39. 
169. See id. 
170. See Todd, supra note 16, at 945. 
l7l. Id. 
172. See id. 
173. lM. Balkin refers to "postmodem constitutionalism" but does so not as a label for law per 
se but in the context of constitutional jurisprudence. Balkin, supra note 30, at 1966. 
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The term has not, other than in a few instances noted below, been used as a label, 
despite the ubiquity of such a use in other disciplines. 174 
Jonathan Simon uses the term when he briefly refers to certain criminal laws 
such as the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO") 
and felony firearm restrictions. 175 Simon uses the term postmodern law more as a 
heuristic to analyze legal reasoning in American criminal law, rather than as a 
label for particular laws. 176 He points to the fragmentation and privatization of 
criminal law in the postmodern era in his elucidation of how he now teaches the 
development of criminal law. 177 
In her scholarship, Barbara Stark also uses the term postmodern to describe 
her proposal for an alternative form of marriage, or "Marriage Proposals," which 
she labels "postmodern marriage law.,,178 Such law, if adopted, would deserve 
the postmodern label because it "explicitly contemplates varied, changing, 
contextualized forms of marriage, [which] may in fact be more compatible with 
contingent, problematic, but nevertheless enduring human love, than the reified 
abstraction we now call 'marriage.",179 Professor Stark suggests a marriage law 
that "clearly set[ s] out the parties' respective rights and responsibilities during 
marriage as well as at divorce." 180 She contemplates a variety of marriages 
emanating from interest groups and proliferating through the Internet, such as 
"'Green Marriage' (in which the parties would commit to recycling, paying extra 
for "green power" and Sierra Club Outing vacations) [and] 'International 
Marriage' (addressing the specific legal problems faced by partners of different 
nationalities, or with families in different countries).,,181 
Stark uses the label postmodem as a device to expose and critique the 
current unitary, "one-size-fits-all" marriage law. 182 Her proposal for a multi-
tiered and more flexible marriage law is aptly labeled postmodern in the same 
way a building can be called postmodern for its architectural style. While 
Professor Stark's proposal for a postmodern marriage is unlikely to bc adopted in 
the near future, Stark's use of the term postmodern in relation to her marriage 
proposals demonstrates the value of the term. 183 
174. See Jonathan Simon, Teaching Criminal Law in an Era of Governing through Crime, 48 
ST. LOUIS L.J. 1313, 1331 (2004); Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to 
Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1479, 1482 (2001). A number of other scholars, such 
as Jack Balkin, use the term in the context of jurisprudential theory and speak of a "Postmodern 
Constitutionalism" or how the American Constitution is postmodern in its characterization as a 
"living document." See Balkin, supra note 30, at 1967-69. But these writings about 
postmodernism do not use the term as a label, as this article proposes. 
175. Simon, supra note 174, at l331. 
176. See id. 
177. fd. at l333-34. 
178. Stark, supra note 174, at 1479. 
179. fd. at 1482. 
180. fd. at 1526. 
181. fd. 
182. fd. at 1545. 
183. fd. at 1511 ("By looking at marriage law from a postmodern perspective ... we discern that 
it actually serves multiple functions. For some couples, marriage may well serve as a refuge from a 
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Finally, U go Mattei and Anna di Robilant make a direct parallel of the way 
the term postmodern is used in architecture by applying the term, primarily 
metaphorically, to the law and the "building" of "legal Europe.,,184 Postmo-
dernism, according to Mattei and di Robilant, provides promise for the 
comparative lawyer in the development of a European Civil Code. 185 
Postmodernism provides "the attitude of respect for diversity and multiplicity, 
aiming at fragmentation and hybridization, suggest[ing] new grounds, a new 
philosophY, and new contents for the code that are better able to consider the new 
'Geist. ",ul'6 
Mattei and di Robilant's use of the label is more prescriptive and theoretical 
rather than descriptive of a current law. Their connection between the use of the 
term in other disciplines-particularly architecture·-and its promise in the law 
captures the value and promise of the postmodern label as applied to law, 
particularly in the comparative and international context. 187 
Unlike these earlier legal scholars, this article proposes a more formal 
taxonomical use of the tenn postmodern, using the characteristics identified by 
scholars of postmodernism both in and outside of the legal academy. The 
consensus of the definition of postmodernism coalesces around themes or general 
characteristics that describe the term. 18S Stephen Feldman names eight "themes" 
of postmodernism found in American jurisprudence that provide a definition for 
postmodernism for those in the legal academy. 189 He characterizes post-
modernism as: (1) anti-foundationalist and anti-essentialist; 190 (2) challenging 
certainty, edifices, and boundaries;191 (3) involving paradoxes; 192 (4) concerned 
cold postmodern world. But for others, marriage serves very different purposes, often changing 
over time."). 
184. Mattei & Robilant, supra note 160, at 1057. 
185. Id. at 1090. 
186. Id. at 1089. 
187. Id. 
188. See HANS BERTENS, THE IDEA OF THE POSTMODERN: A HISTORY 203 (1995); FELDMAN, 
supra note 10, at 38-44; Feldman, supra note 5, at 1080; Barbara Stark, Women and Globalization: 
The Failure and Postmodem Possibilities of International Law, 33 V Arm. I TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 
546 (2000); Todd, supra note 16, at 909. 
189. FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 38-44. 
190. Id. at 38. 
191. Id at 39. Postmodernism recognizes that social structures are not rigid or fixed. A 
postmodern law takes into account the "contingency and plasticity of social structures. Structures 
are not stable but are constantly being negotiated, constructed and reconstructed in everyday 
relations between actors and entities." Id at 173. Laws with these attributes are subject to labeL 
See William L.F. Feldstiner & Austin Serat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and 
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1448-49 (1992); Susan S. 
Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural Analysis of Law, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 39, 41-42 (1992). 
192. FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 39-40. Consistent with postmodernists penchant to question 
postmodernism itself, scholars of post modernism also identifY these paradoxical characteristics: 
(1) it is anti-theory which is essentially a theory; (2) it stresses the in-ational but instruments 
of reason a [sic] freely employed within the movement; (3) it [sic] emphasis on the marginal 
is an evaluative emphasis; (4) it stresses intertextuality but often treats texts in isolation (e.g., 
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with power, especially linguistic and discursive power;193 (5) emphasizing "social 
construction of the self' (as opposed to an independent or autonomous self);194 
(6) "self-reflexive or self-referential;" 195 (7) ironic; 196 and (8) politically ambi-
valent (and even neoconservative).197 Other scholars studying postmodernism 
identify these additional characteristics: "(1) celebrating fragmentation, 
uncertainty and chaos; (2) connection to everyday consumerism and consumer 
transactions; and (3) utilizing and intertwining high-technology and the Internet 
with things low-tech and primitive.,,198 
The wide scope of these characteristics reflects the vagueness of postmo-
dernism. Despite the underlying vagueness associated with postmodernism, 
there is also consensus that the core of postmodernism is defined by ontological 
uncertainty, fragmentation, and rejection of master narratives. 199 
When searching for these characteristics in various laws, it is apparent that 
most laws aspire to be, and indeed are, thoroughly modernist. From municipal 
ordinances regulating behavior in a local p~rk 200 to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,201 most laws are intended to be consistent, rational, and fair?02 
But even modern laws may have some postmodern characteristics while retaining 
their modern character. They might be fragmentary, decentralized, uncertain, or 
allow a multiplicity of interpretations, but their core regulatory function 
deconstruction VS. internet intertextuality); (5) by rejecting modem criteria for assessing 
theory, it cannot argue there are no valid criteria for judging. 
Todd, supra note 16, at 908 n.90 (citing PAULJ},'E MARIE ROSENAU, POST-MoDERNISM AND THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS, INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS (1991)). 
193. FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 40. 
194. fd. at 41. 
195. fd. at 42. 
196. Id. at 43. 
197. See id. at 43-44. 
198. Todd, supra note 16, at 909 (citing BERTENS, supra note 188, at 203; Feldman, supra note 
5, at 1080; Stark, supra note 188, at 546; The Po-Mo Page, Postrnodem, Postmodemism, 
Postrnodemity, http://www9.georgetown.edulfaculty/irvinemltheory/pomo.htm1(last visited Oct. 
30, 2008)). See also ARTHUR ASA BERGER, THE PORTABLE POSTMODER.:.'1IST 98-100 (2003) 
(discussing characteristics of postmodemism in the arts). 
199. LYOTARD, supra note 47, at xxiv-xxv ("1 define postrnodem as incredulity toward 
metanarratives. "). 
200. See, e.g., 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10:7 (3d ed. 
1998); DAVIS, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 27.02.130 (1971), available at http://www.city.davis.ca. 
us! cmol citycodel detaiLcfm?p=27 &q= 1 073. 
201. 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (2006). 
202. Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill, & Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst (and Five 
Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. U. L REv. 1,5-20 (2000). Some argue the Tax Code is so 
complex, confusing, and disjointed that it is not the modem ideal. See Michelle Amopol Cecil, 
Toward Adding Further Complexity to the Internal Revenue Code: A New Paradigm for the 
Deductibility of Capital Losses, 1999 U. ILL. L REV. 1083, 1085 (citing numerous references, 
including congressional statements and commentators critical of the complexity of the Internal 
Revenue Code). 
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demonstrate modernist principles and make them not postmodern laws,203 The 
postmodern label more appropriately applies when the law rejects a "master 
narrative" and embraces paradox, is grounded or rooted in daily life, and is 
connected to the Internet, cyberspace, or other forms of high technology,204 
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA"j-°5 is an example 
of a law that contains some postmodern characteristics, but is sufficiently modem 
in its scope that the label is not appropriate, 206 In its first postmodem 
characteristic, the TCPA, ironically and rather paradoxically, requires Americans 
to give up some privacy (their phone numbers and email addresses) in order to 
gain another form of privacy (freedom from certain types of telemarketing 
calls), 207 While the TCPA is a federal law, plaintiffs must bring actions to 
enforce it in state court, another characteristically postmodern paradox,208 Last, 
the TCP A initially had a rather large loophole in that it did not apply to calls 
originating from outside of the United States, thus permitting telemarketing calls 
from call centers in places like India, but shutting down United States call 
centers. This loophole was closed in the Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of2003.209 
Despite these rather postmodern traits, the TCP A is thoroughly modem and 
not postmodem in its general coherency and fixed nature. The law has clear 
boundaries and clearly normative functions that are not subject to much 
ambiguity or flux.2lO Those who enacted and subsequently interpreted it appear 
203. All laws have a ccrtain amount of indetcrminancy. This issue is explored considerably in 
James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Methods and the Rule of 
Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517, 517-18, 520 (2006). 
204. See The Po-Mo Page, supra note 198. 
205. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006)). 
206. See id. 
207. Id. The Do-:Not-CaU Registry is maintained by two federal the Federal Trade 
Commission and Federal Communications Commission. It permits consumers to place their phone 
numbers on a national list of consumers who do not wish to be called by telemarketers. The law 
and the way it has been implemented implicates postmodemism because of its connection to high 
technology, consumerism, irony, and uncertainty. The law's connection to consumerism and high 
technology is self-evident due to its very nature and also its method of implementation. Abusive 
Telemarketing Acts or Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2006); Delivery Restrictions, 47 
C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) (2006). The phone numbers on the register are available to telemarketing 
firms who can, besides amending their telephone lists, adapt their strategy to people and 
their addresses matched to the telephone numbers. See FED. TRADE Q&A: THE NATIONAL 
Do NOT CALL REGISTRY 2 (2008) (providing registry information), available at http://www.fic.gov/ 
bcp/edulpubs/consumer/alerts/alt 1 07. pdf. 
208. Hilaiy B. Miller & Robert R Biggerstaff, Application of the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act to Intrastate Telemarketing Calls and Faxes, 52 FED. COMM. LJ. 667, 669 (2000) 
("Congress intended for private enforcement actions to be brought by pro se plaintiffs in small 
claims court and practically limited enforcement to such tribunals."). 
209. See 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006). 
210. See. e.g., Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 208, at 686 (arguing that TCPA applies to both 
interstate and purely intrastate telemarketing calls and faxes). 
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to agree about the meaning of its tenns.2!l Furthennore, while the law may be 
subject to change from constitutional challenge or opposition from telemarketing 
interest groups, these are not changes built into the law itself.212 
Other laws can similarly use postmodernism as a tool to analyze and critique 
the law,213 but simply being subject to a postmodern critique does not make a law 
postmodern. As discussed below, the subject of the law itself needs to be in flux 
or illusive for the label to be apt and useful. 
v. ApPLYING THE LABEL TO LAWS COMING OUT OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 
Two examples of laws that can be labeled postmodern involve subject 
matter arising out of computers, the Internet, and Internet-related technology. 
The first example is the "law" or code that controls the programs found in 
computers and Internet web sites.214 The second is the Safe Harbor Agreement 
regulating data privacy between the U.s. and the E.U.215 
The tenn postmodern highlights two different characteristics about these 
two areas of the law. The law or code creating and refulating the way computer 
users interact in virtual domains such as Second Life21 and LamdaM00217 fit the 
characteristics of a postmodern law due to their ontological uncertainty, flux, 
connection to high technology, consumerism, and social construction of 
themselves.218 But the postmodern nature of these codes questions whether they 
can be deemed law at all. 
211. See, e.g., Moser v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 46 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
515 U.S. 1161 (1995); Destination Ventures Ltd. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 46 F.3d 54,57 (9th 
Clf. 1995) (finding the restrictions in the TCPA were constitutional). 
212. The Registry has withstood constitutional challenge. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. 
Fed. Trade Comm'n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1250-51 (lOth Cir. 2003.), cert denied, 543 U.S. 812 (2004). 
See also Nafl Coalition of Prayer, Inc. v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that "the 
state's interest in protecting residents' right not to endure unwanted speech in their own homes 
outweighs any First Amendment interests"). 
213. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Postmodem "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and 
Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97,100-01 (1993). 
214. See infra notes Part V.A. 
215. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 
Fed. Reg. 56534-01 (Sept. 19, 2000); Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to 
European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000). See also Safe Harbor Documents, 
supra note 19. 
216. Second Life is a multiplayer online role playing game. Second Life: Official Site of the 
Free 3D Online Virtual World, http://secondlife.com!(last visited Oct. 30, 2008) [hereinafter 
Second Life]. 
217. LamdaMOO (with LamdaMOO map), An Introduction, http://www.lambdamoo.info/(last 
visited Oct. 30, 2008). See also Jennifer L. Mnookin, Virtual(ly) Law: The Emergence of Law in 
LambdaMOO, J. COlvfPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., June 1996, http://jcmc.indiana.edulvol2Iissuell 
lambda.html (discussing the development of legal and political systems in the virtual world of 
LamdaMOO). 
218. See Mnookin, supra note 217. 
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In contrast, the Safe Harbor Agreement is clearly a law in the more 
traditional sense; it is codified in the Federal Registe(119 and acknowledged as a 
law by the legal community. 220 But its postmodem characteristics highlight 
serious problems about this law as a means of regulation and enforcement of 
social norms. The subject matter of the Safe Harbor Agreement, data privacy, 
changes rapidly due to new technologies and changing attitudes concerning 
privacy. 221 The postmodern label seems particularly apt since there is not a 
perfected, complete, formed, or even coherent subject to be regulated by the 
law. 222 In addition, those enacting the regulations and those subject to the 
regulations have such disparate interpretations of the law that similar ontological 
concerns can be raised about the effectiveness and even the existence of this 
regulation as a form oflaw.223 
A. Code and Virtual Reality as Sources of Postmodern Law 
"A code as law" is from the postmodern era, but arguably cannot be subject 
to the label of a postmodern law because it is not technically "law.,,224 Lawrence 
Lessig, who set forth the notion of "a code as law," stated that computer code is 
not law, but may regulate conduct in much the same way that legal codes do.225 
While a code as law is a medium through which law can be made, computer code 
is merely instructions given to a computer.226 This code, however, can set the 
parameters of what a computer program or Internet site might allow the user to 
do.227 It acts as normative rules governing the behavior of Internet and computer 
users. "The nature and values of cyberspace hinge on the coding decisions of 
programmers, which means that the decisions made by big companies like 
219. Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000). 
220. See Vinita Bali, Data Privacy, Data Piracy: Can India Provide Adequate Protection 
Electronically Transferred Data?, 21 TEMP. Im'L &COMP. L.J. 103, 111-13 (2007). 
221. Tracey DiLascio, Note, How Safe is the Safe Harbor? US. and E. U Data Privacy Law 
and the Enforcement of the FTC's Harbor Program, 22 B.D. INT'L L.J. 399,409 (2004). 
222. Id. 
223. !d. 
224. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 679, 681 (2003) (citing LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 89 (1999». 
225. Id. at 682. See also Cindy A. Cohn & James Grimmelmann, Seven Wcrys in Which Code 
Equals Law (and One in Which It Does Not), in CODE: THE LANGUAGE OF OUR TNE 20, 20 
(Gerfried Stocker & Christine Schopf eds., 2003) (stating that "computer code is nothing more or 
less than legal code transplanted to the electronic realm"). 
226. Lessig cleverly refers to "East Coast Code" being code or law written by lawmakers in 
Washington, D.C. to be executed by the government and "West Coast Code" being code or "law" 
written in Silicon Valley, California to be executed by computers and their users. Lawrence Lessig, 
The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1798 (2002). 
227. See Orin Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 372 (2003) 
("Saying that the power of code is akin to the power of law is simply too loose a use of the word 
"law" to be helpful. If code is law to an Internet user, then a sports referee's calls are law to an 
athlete, and Steven Spielberg's decisions about how to shoot a movie are law to a movie viewer."). 
Fall 2008] LABELING LA W "POSTMODERN" 131 
America Online and Microsoft have the force of law in cybcrspace.,,228 Thus, 
many scholars~ven Lessig himself--see code in certain contexts as, indeed, 
law."29 
This ontological uncertainty and illusiveness as "law" indicates that 
computcr code, particularly when behaving as law, deservcs the label of 
"postmodern law.,,23o The codes regulating Internet sites that host virtual reality 
and role-playing games provide examples of how code is a postmodern law. 
Online games and virtual worlds have laws that are embedded within the code of 
the virtual world.231 For example, some games are designed so the characters can 
only exhibit certain attributes and cannot appear naked 232 or as a child 
character.233 Other games and worlds are less restricted in their code and allow 
the user/player a wide range of freedom in the way he or she acts, dresses, or 
treats others in the virtual world.234 The world constructed in the Internet virtual 
rcality role-playing game called Second Life is popular beeause of the freedom 
offered to the users in creating characters, or "avatars," and establishing 
relationships with other characters. 235 But the Internet creates questions about 
what rules of behavior or "law" govern the virtual world. Some of the behavior 
taking place in this online virtual reality spills over and leads to disputes and 
lawsuits in both the real world and the world of the role-playing game.236 In 
addition, the code of the game is altered to enforce normative behavior both in 
the game and in the real world.237 As the nature of the law within the virtual 
228. Id. at 369. 
229. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL L. REv. 1, 11 
(2004). See also Wu, supra note 224, at 682 (proposing that computer code should be used "as an 
alternative to lobbying campaigns, tax avoidance, or any other approach that a group might use to 
seek legal advantage"). 
230. Posting of Tateru Nino to Second Life Insider, http://www.secondlifeinsider.com/2007/ 
05/311code-is-law/ (May 31, 2007, 00:01 EST). 
231. See id. 
232. See Tecmo, Inc. v. Greiling, No. 05 Civ. 0394 (N.D. Ill. 2(05). The manufacturer of the 
"Ninja Gaiden" and "Dead or Alive" video game series filed suit against a group of hackers who 
are accused of distributing software code to change the appearance of the games' characters, 
including making them appear naked. Id. 
233. For example, in the online role-playing game Kingdoms of Caernarfon, no role playing 
(avatar) of children is permitted. See Kingdoms of Caernarfon, http://www.creativitychat.com/ 
rooms/kingdom.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
234. See Second Life, supra note 216. Second Life is an online virtual world designed and run 
by Linden Research, Inc. It is another example of a multi-player role-playing game. 
235. See Posting of Tateru Nino to Second Life Insider, supra note 230. 
236. See, e.g., Eric Reuters, SL Business Sues for Copyright Infringement, REUTERS, July 3, 
2007, http://secondlife.reuters .eom/stories/2007 /07 /03!sl-business-sues-for-copyright-
infringement!. See also Stephanie Francis Ward, Fantasy Life, Real Life, A.B.A. J., May 2007, at 
42,43-46 (discussing the lives and second lives of various legal professionals); Bettina M. Chin, 
Note, Regulating Your Second Life-Defamation in Virtual Worlds, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 1303,1315 
(2007) (discussing how advertising, politics, and even Judge Posner have made their way into 
Second Life). 
237. See Posting of Tateru Nino to Second Life Insider, supra note 230. 
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world of a place like Second Life emerges among its players and developers, the 
law is ripe for the label postmodern?38 
Another virtual reality web game, LambdaMOO, is also made up of code 
containing forms of "postmodern law.,,239 LambdaMOO's designers voluntarily 
relinquished control over regulation of the game and instead implemented a 
formal petition system through which users can petition for a change in the 
structure ofLambdaMOO?40 "Once a petition gets enough signatures, it goes up 
for a vote by all users, and the results are then published. Once new rules [are] 
approved, the game's wizards (as its designers [are] called) implement[] them 
using code."241 For example, users have petitioned for and instituted forms of 
"property rights," regulated character names, and banned bulk e_mails.242 Users 
have even petitioned to remove the petition system.243 The laws created in this 
virtual world have modernist characteristics; they strive to regulate the virtual 
world using democratic paradigms familiar to its users. 244 The code that 
underlies these virtual laws, however, is truly "postrnodern." 245 Like a 
constitution, the code allows for the petition process and the emergent modernist 
laws to take fonn in this virtual reality.246 The code acts (;lS the true regulator and 
has the ultimate authority in this virtual space?47 
Some have argued that law arising from Internet technologies-often 
referred to as cyberlaw-"offers nothing new" and is "old wine in new 
bottles.,)248 This sentiment is correct concerning most of the law found emanating 
from the Internet. 249 Courts have used traditional doctrines from criminal, 
238. Richard Posner's appearance as an avatar in Second Life to talk about his book in front of 
an audience of avatars, including human, animal, and alien, can be labeled as rather postmodern. 
See Posting of Robert J. Ambrogi to Legal Blog Watch, http://legalblogwateh.typepad.com/ 
legal_blog_ watch/2006/12/judge~osners_s.html (Dec. 12,2006,02:28 EST). 
239. LambdaMOO, supra note 217. 
240. Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, To Kill an Avatar, LEGAL AJ'FAJRS, July/Aug. 2003, 




244. See Id. 
245. See id. 
246. ld. 
247. ld. 
248. Kerr, supra note 227, at 373 (citing United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 536 (D. 
Mass. 1994». See also Michael Edmund O'Neill, Old Crimes in New Bottles: Sanctioning 
Cybercrime, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 240-41 (2000) ("Although the fundamental nature of 
offenses being committed in this manner are really no different from garden variety [crimes] ... , 
what makes cybercrime unique is that the means of undertaking the criminal conduct is 
substantially different from dropping into the local liquor store, hitting the proprietor over the head, 
and running away with the tilL"); Lenese C. Herbert, Cybercrimes and Hacking Issues, in ALI-
ABA COGRSEOF STUDY, INTERNET LAWFORTHEPRACTlCAL Apr. 21, 2005, SK102 ALI-
ABA 139 ("[C]ybercrimes are really old crimes committed with new technology."). 
249. See, e.g., lustin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44 B.C. L. REv. 359, 
373-93 (2003) (discussing various traditional legal noons and their applicability to the Internet). 
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contract, tort, and property laws to resolve disputes resulting from the Internet.25o 
But many scholars recognize that current laws have their limitations in the 
context of the Internet and that new paradigms must be developed that go bels0nd 
the "law" found in traditional modernist statutes and common law decisions. 51 
Postmodern law provides promise for this broader and more sweeping 
Internet regulation. For example, the difficulties in combating cybercrimes call 
for new and innovative approaches to law as new technologies emerge allowing 
cybercriminals to elude existing regulation.252 Combating crime over the Internet 
will require not a single, modernist set oflaws emanating from Washington, but a 
multi-faceted, multi-pronged conglomeration of forces involving enacted law, 
common law, markets, lobbying, and customs.253 Postmodern law adapts to the 
complexity involved in regulation and allows for the possibility that public law 
might have detrimental or unintended effects on other realms of regulation. 
The more onto logically-uncertain, high-technology, fragmented, illusive law 
found in computer code is one part of the new protocols emerging to provide 
order, social regulation, regularity, and dispute resolution in the postmodern era. 
Unless it can incorporate flexibility and adaptability, a single monolithic 
regulatory scheme like that found in the E.U.'s Data Privacy Directive may well 
be inadequate and misguided as the way of regulating cyberspace.254 A post-
modem mix is needed. A combination of traditional law (such as statutes and 
common law doctrines), self-regulation, contracting principles, code writing, and 
social and consumer pressure, is the basis of law for the Internet for the near 
250. See 1. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regimefor "Cyberspace, H 55 U. PITT. L. REv. 993, 
995 (1994); Hughes, supra note 249, at 373-93; Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 229, at 72-73. 
251. See, e.g., Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 229, at 62; James Grimmelmann, Note, 
Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.1. 1719, 1743 (2005). Grimmehnann speeifically notes: 
"[D]ecisions about the technical future of the Internet are important questions of social policy, 
because these decisions will have the force of law even as they defy many of our assumptions about 
law." Grimmehnann, supra, at 1721. 
252. See O'Neill, supra note 248, at 240-41. See also Hardy, supra note 250, at 1000-02 
(presenting an example of how defamation law can become diffieu1t to resolve in situations 
involving Internet postings); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be 
Governed?: A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in 
COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62, 62 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997) (suggesting a 
"decentralized process that does not closely resemble [the systems 1 we have used in the past to pass 
laws and enforce behavioral nonns"); Aron Mefford, Note, Lex Informatica: Foundations of Law 
on the Internet, 5 L'ID. 1. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 237 (1997) (discussing how "the mere 
extension of the physieal world laws and government jurisdiction to Cyberspace will ultimately 
prove ineffeetive"); Brent Wible, Note, A Site Where Hackers Are Welcome: Using Hack-In 
Contests to Shape Preferences and Deter Computer Crime, 112 YALE L.J. 1577, 1622-23 (2003) 
(proposing the use of non-legal tools to deter crime on the Intemet). 
253. See O'Neill, supra note 248, at 274-75. See also Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: 
Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems of 
Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 991, 992-93 (2004) (discussing 
possible solutions for the problem of protecting Internet privacy). 
254. See Morey Elizabeth Barnes, Comment, Falling Short of the Mark: The United States 
Response to the European Union's Data Privacy Directive, 27 Nw. 1. INT'L L. & Bus. 171, 177-79 
(2006). 
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future, or at least as long as this high-technology law remains connected to 
technologies and social dynamics that are in flux, like a moving train. 
Since computer hardware and software and the Internet are changing at such 
a dizzying speed, any law that is in fact created by code is in a state of flux, 
indeterminate, and uncertain. Ontological uncertainty raises the question as to 
whether code can be considered "law" at alL But when deemed a form of law, 
the label postmodern is appropriate. 
B. Safe Harbor Agreement 
The Safe Harbor Agreement,255 which regulates data privacy, also deserves 
the label postmodern. The Safe Harbor Agreement challenges a modernist label 
because it is not strictly rational, orderly, or capable of a single definition or 
explanation.256 It has postmodern traits, such as being fragmented, paradoxical, 
and intertwined with high technology and mass consumerism.257 It is particularly 
suited for the label because it is a law relating to high technologies and may be 
interpreted and implemented by very different legal systems with divergent legal 
traditions relating to the regulation of privacy. 258 These traits highlight the 
ultimate problem with the Safe Harbor Agreement: its uncertain and illusive 
nature makes it inapposite for purposes of regulating conduct and providing 
certainty in relationships. 
The Safe Harbor Agreement came out of the E.U. 's sweeping and 
comprehensive data privacy legislation instituting strict measures to protect 
255. Issuancc of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission: 
Procedures and Start Data for Safc Harbor List, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,534 (Scpt. 19, 2000); Issuance of 
Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 
2000). See also Safe Harbor Documents, sLpra note 19 (providing access to the documents that 
"constitute the 'safe harbor' privacy framework that the Department of Commerce has negotiated 
with the European Commission"). 
256. See Todd, supra note 16, at 897-98. 
257. Id. at 915 ("In this post-modem era, the real world is fragmented, uncertain, diverse, 
rapidly changing, imbued with complex high-technology and archaic tradition, secular rationalism 
and religious fundamentalism, paradox, irony and mass consumerism. 
258. For a general discussion and criticism of the Safe Harbor Agreement, see Barbara 
Cmtchfield et a1., US. Multinational Employers: Navigating Through the "Safe Harbor" 
Principles to Comply with the E.U Data Directive, 38 AM. BUS. LJ. 735,781 (2001). See 
also JAN DHONT, MARfA VERONICA PEREZ AsINARI, & YVES POULLET, SAFE HARBOUR DECISION 
IMPLEMENTATION STUDY 110-11 (2004) (discussing the agencies and groups needed in order for the 
Safe Harbor Agreement to work in the Cnited States), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice _ home/fsjlprivacy/docs/studies/safe-harbour-2004_ en.pdf; Gregory Shaffer, Globalization 
and Social Protection: The Impact of E.U. and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of u.s. 
Privacy Standards, 25 YALE 1. INT'L L. 1,55-88 (2000) (arguing that U.S. privacy standards have 
become tougher due to pressure from the E.U.); David A. Castor, Note, Treading Water in the Data 
Privacy Age: An Analysis of Safe Harbor's First Year, 12 Ir-n. INT'L& COMPo L. REv. 265, 289-90 
(2002) (stating that many critics of the Safe Harbor Agreement believe that the United States has 
"lost a piece of its ultimate sovereignty by compromising with the Safe Harbor principles"); David 
Raj Nijhawan, Note, The Emperor Has No Clothes: A Critique of Applying the European Union 
Approach to Privacy Regulation in the United States, 56 V AND. L. REV. 939, 958-75 (2003) 
(discussing the effect of the Safe Harbor Agreement on First Amendment rights). 
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privacy?59 The RU. Privacy Directive limited data collection only for specified, 
explicit, and legitimate purposes (indiscriminate data collection was 
forbidden).26o This legal regime is in stark contrast to the U.S.'s approach to 
protecting data privacy.261 The United States has a mishmash of fragmentary 
data protection laws that do not have any overall coherence.262 Under U.S. law, 
only certain discrete areas provide for detailed protection?63 For example, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIP AA) provides privacls 
protection for medical data; 264 the Financial Services Modernization Act 2 5 
purports to protect individual privacy, but in fact gants the financial industry the 
ability to collect vast amounts of personal data; 56 and video renters have their 
videotape choices (but not their DVD choiees) protected under the Video Privacy 
Protection Act.267 Outside of these discrete areas, much of U.S. data protection is 
subject to self-regulation. Online data collection, in particular, remains 
unregulated, affording little privacy to users.268 
The differences between the two approaches to protecting data privacy 
created problems for American companies doing business in the E.U. because 
they had to develop different, stricter guidelines for E.U. customers.269 Also, the 
creators of the E.U. directive recognized that the directive could be circumvented 
if E.U. businesses simply sent data to be stored and processed in a country with 
lax privacy laws.270 The RU. Directive thus forbid the transmission of data to 
any country with inadequate privacy protections. 271 The U.S. fell into this 
category.272 To shield u.s. companies from penalties under the E.U. Directive, 
259. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 29, 1995 OJ. (L 281) (EC). 
260. Id. 
261. See Bignami,supra note 155, at 619-22. 
262. See ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY INT'L, PRIVACY & HUMAN RIGHTS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF PRIVACY LAW AND DEVELOPMENTS 730-58 (2005), available at 
http://www.privacyinternational.orgisurvey/phr2005iPHR2005swed-ven.pdf. 
263. Id. at 736-37. 
264. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2000). 
265. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999), 15 U.s.C. 
§§ 6801--09 (2006). 
266. James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REv. 
1, 56-58 (2003). 
267. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006). 
268. Many computer experts have said essentially there is no data privacy in the United States: 
'''You have zero privacy. Get over it'" A Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. 
REv. 1461,1462 (2000) (quoting Scott McNealy, CEO, Sun Microsystems, Inc.). 
269. Farrell, supra note 23, at 293. 
270. ld. at 289. 
271. ld. 
272. RICHARD A. SPINELLO, REGULATING CYBERSPACE: THE POLICIES AND TECHNOLOGIES OF 
CONTROL 190 (CJl'eenwood Publishing Group 2002); Elizabeth de Bony, E. U. Rejects u.s. Data 
Privacy Protection as Inadequate, CNN.cOM, July 7, 2000, http://archivcs.cnn.com/2000/TECH! 
computingl07/07/safe.harbor.idg/indcx.htmL 
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the United States and the European Union entered into the Safe Harbor 
Agreement,273 which intended to bridge their different approaches.274 
The different approaches to data privacy result from very different 
perspectives of the United States and the European Union on privacy in general. 
The European perspective on privacy focuses on dignity, while the American 
perspective is more focused on liberty. 275 The European Union views data 
privacy as an issue of public concern while the United States approaches it as a 
personal issue. 276 The Safe Harbor Agreement is designed to bridge these 
conflictin9 and seemingly irreconcilable approaches to regulation of data privacy. 27 The Safe Harbor Agreement did not require legislative change. 278 
Instead, it allowed the United States to claim that it was maintaining its principles 
of self-regulation, and it allowed the European Union to claim that it upheld its 
privacy principles,z79 The flexibility and ambiguity arising from the Safe Harbor 
Agreement's postmodern characteristics allows these conflicting approaches to 
co-exist in a single law. 280 Thus, by being postmodern, the Safe Harbor 
Agreement can function as a law in a context where its modernist equivalent 
would fail. 
The Safe Harbor Agreement is a voluntary program administered by the 
Department of Commerce and "enforced" by the Federal Trade Commission 
("FTC,,).281 Under the Safe Harbor Agreement, companies "self certify" throu~h 
a process available on the U. S. Department of Commerce website. 82 
Certification commits the eompany to adhere to the agreement's data privacy 
principles.283 These principles are: 
---.. --- --- --_._--- ---- ----
273. For an interesting account of the negotiations between U.S. and E.U. officials, see 
SPINELLO, supra note 272, at 277. 
274. The Safe Harbor Agreement "allowed the United States to claim publicly that its basic 
policy stance of protecting privacy through self-regulation was unchanged, while allowing the 
European Union to help dictate the tenus ofregulation." Farrell, supra note 23, at 292. 
275. Bignami, supra note 155, at 681; Bert-Jaap Koops & Ronald Leenes, 'Code' and the Slow 
Erosion of Privacy, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH L. REv. 115, 122 (2005) (citing James Q. 
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 
(2004». 
276. Marcy E. Peek, Infonnation Privacy and Corporate Power: Towards a Re-Imagination of 
Information Privacy Law, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 127, 162-63 (2006). 
277. Farrell, supra note 23, at 296. 
278. Id. at 292. 
279. fd. 
280. fd. at 292-93. 
281. Safe Harbor Overview, http://www.export.gov/safeharborISafeHarborInfo.htm (last visited 
Oct. 30,2008). 
282. fd. 
283. Bames, supra note 254, at 180-83. See also James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A. 
Eleftheriou, The E.U.-U.S. Privacy Safe Harbor: Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?, 9 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 145, 153-54 (2001) (discussing enforcement mechanisms required to be 
used by companies in order to receive the benefits of the Safe Harbor Agreement). These se1f-
certifying entities are listed on the U.S. Department of Commerce website as organizations to 
which E.U. Member States may transfer data. Safe Harbor List, http://web,ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/ 
shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
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(1) The company "must provide clear and conspicuous notice to individuals" 
regarding the purpose of any data collected and used, as well as regarding complaint 
mechanisms available.284 
(2) Individuals may choose to opt out if the collected data will be used for a 
purpose that is different from its original purpose, or if data will be transferred to 
third parties.285 Alternatively, individuals may choose to opt in if the data being 
collected is sensitive, such as if it relates to race, religion, or ethnicity?86 
(3) The company may transfer personal data to third parties only if they comply 
with the principles of notice and choice?87 
(4) Individuals must be permitted access to collected information?88 
(5) The company must maintain the security of the personal data by exercising 
reasonable precaution?89 
(6) The company must maintain the integrity of data, ensuring that it is relevant to 
the purpose for which it was collected, accurate, and current.290 
(7) The company must provide mechanisms to enforce the Safe Harbor principles. 
It must give data subjects a forum for filing complaints and establish a dispute 
resolution procedure to respond to consumers' grievances?91 
There is an indefinite grace period for United States signatory companies to 
implement these principles.292 Companies have been rather slow at certifying 
themselves under the Safe Harbor A~reement.293 In the first few years, only a 
few hundred companies certified. 2 In 2007, over 1,000 companies had 
certified, but only 918 kept their certification current. 295 A European 
Commission study found that of the companies certified, many were not in 
compliance with the Agreement's principles.296 For example, some companies 
did not comply because privacy policies were not accessible or clear.297 Also, 
284. Assey, Jr. & Eleftheriou, supra note 283, at 151. 
285. Id. 
286. !d. 
287. Id. at 151-52. 
288. Id. at 151. 
289. Id. at 152. 
290. !d. 
291. Id. at 152-53. See also Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 281 (listing the seven 
principles). 
292. See Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 281 (stating no time period in which the companies 
must comply with the principles). 
293. See JOrg Rehder & Erika C. Collins, The Legal Transfer of Employment-Related Data to 
Outside the European Union: Is It Even Still POSSible?, 39 INT'L LAW. 129, 150 (2005) (noting 
that the European Union is unhappy with the low number of companies that have certified). 
294. Bali, supra note 220, at 114. 
295. !d. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 114 ("The privacy policies of companies have been severely criticized due to their 
inaccessibility and lack of clarity. Companies' representations that they had instituted privacy 
programs were generally found to be dubious, unsupported, and inconsistent with the Safe Harbor 
privacy program definition."). 
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some found that the principle of requiring mechanisms for enforcement was 
particularly wanting?9 
The Safe Harbor Agreement provides no individual right of action or right 
to compensation for privacy violations or lack of compliance with the 
Agreement's principles. 299 Additionally, there is little enforcement and no 
systematic review process to determine compliance. 300 Under the Safe Harbor 
Agreement, the FTC is supposed to protect the rights of E.U. citizens in the 
United States. 301 It is unclear, however, whether the Commission has such 
authority ?02 
The FTC is the agency that enforces federal privacy law under the Safe 
Harbor Agreement. 303 It has not effectively or actively enforced the privacy 
law.304 The FTC's ability to bring an action against a company for a data privacls 
violation comes from its authority to prosecute unfair and deceptive practices.3 5 
Ironically, a company that has a privacy policy, or that certifies under the Safe 
Harbor Agreement, is subject to FTC enforcement action, whereas a company 
without certification or a policy would not be.306 Failing to comply with a stated 
298. !d. at 115 (citing DHONT, ASINARI, & POUILET, supra note 258, at 13 ("[T]he reviewers 
were critical of the alternate dispute resolution meehanism adopted by U.S. companies on the 
grounds of inadequacy, lack of procedural transparency, and sanctioning regimes."». 
299. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission: 
Procedures and Start Data for Safe Harbor List, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,534 (Sept. 19, 2000); Issuance of 
Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 
2000). 
300. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission: 
Procedures and Start Data for Safe Harbor List, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,534 (Sept. 19, 2000); Issuance of 
Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 
2000). 
301. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission: 
Procedures and Start Data for Safe Harbor List, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,534 (Sept. 19, 2000); Issuance of 
Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 
2000). 
302. While the Safe Harbor Agreement only provides data protection for individuals residing in 
E.U. member countries and under the Agreement, E.U. citizens enjoy greater privacy protections 
than American citizens. It is unclear whether the FTC can bring an action on behalf of a citizen of 
the E.U .. See Eric Shapiro, Note, All Is Not Fair in the Privacy Trade: The Safe Harbor Agreement 
and the World Trade Organization, 71 FORDHA\1L. REv. 2781, 2789-90 (2003). 
303. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission: 
Procedures and Start Data for Safe Harbor List, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,534 (Sept. 19,2000); Issuance of 
Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 
2000). 
304. See Peek, supra note 276, at 155, 157 ("FTC enforcement actions are few and far between, 
lack effectiveness, and serve little deterrent effect... FTC privacy enforcement actions generally 
result in little more than a symbolic penalty."). 
305. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)-(2) (2006). 
306. See id. 
Fall 2008] LABb'LLVG LAW "POSTMODERN" 139 
privacy policy can be considered unfair or deceptive trade practices and can be 
enforceable by the FTC under 15 U.S.c. § 45(a)(l)-(2).307 
The FTC's rather weak enforcement ability is illustrated by the consent 
decree that the FTC entered into with Gateway Learning CoTs" the company that 
sells products under the "Hooked on Phonics" brand name.3 8 The FTC brought 
a complaint against Gateway because its original privacy policy did not allow 
sharing of personally identifiable consumer information without explicit 
consent.309 Gateway subsequently violated this policy by renting its customers' 
infonnation to third parties.310 In the consent decree, Gatewax admitted to no 
\vTongdoing and promised not to violate its privacy policy.3 1 Gateway also 
agreed to give the Treasury the $4608 it earned from renting consumers' 
infonnation.3J2 Gateway did not compensate its customers.313 Instead, Gateway 
altered its policy to allow for less individual data privacy in the future.314 
Consistent with its multiplicity of interpretations, commentators hold widely 
divergent opinions of the Safe Harbor Agreement's effectiveness as a regulatory 
mechanism for protecting privacy. 315 Some commentators see it as a great 
advance in the protection of privacy because it provides a coherent strategy for 
creating a data privacy regime on a global scale. This is particularly important in 
the United States, where such regulation is needed.316 Others see it as a sham, a 
.. -~.--.--.---
307. See In re B1's Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 477 (2005). See also Fed. Trade 
Comm'n v. Trustsoft, Inc., Civ. No. H05-1905, 2005 WL 1523915, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 14,2005) 
(granting a deceptive act injunction concerning privacy and security representations in software). 
308. In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 444 (2004). See also Bethany Rubin 
Henderson, Hey, That's Personal! When Companies Sell Customer Information Gathered through 
the Internet, Bes. L. TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 13, 13 (discussing recent prosecutions by the FTC 
for violations of company privacy policies); Press Release, lied. Trade Comm'n, Gateway Learning 
Settles FTC Privacy Charges Company Rented Customer Information It Pledged to Keep Private 
(July 7, 2004) (on file with the University of Toledo Law Review) (discussing the settlement 
between Gateway Learning and the FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa!2004/07/ 
gateway.shtm. 







315. Jeanette Perez, Privacy Matters: Safe Harbor Agreement Finds Friends at HP and Foes in 
Congress, INTELLIGENT ENTERPRISE, May 7, 2001, http://www.intelligententerprise.coml010507/ 
news3.jhtmL See also David A. Tallman, Note, Financial Institutions and the Saft Harbor 
Agreement: Securing Cross-Border Financial Data Flows, 34 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 747,754-
55 (2003) ("The European Union has specifically found that the United States does not provide 
adequate privacy protection."); Privacy International, Privacy and Human Rights Overview 2003, 
http://vvww.privacyintemationa1.org/survey/phr2003/overview.htm ("Privacy advocates and 
consumer groups both in the United States and Europe are highly critical of the European 
Commission's decision to approve the agreement, which they say will fail to provide European 
citizens with adequate protection for their personal data."). 
316. See Perez, supra note 315. 
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failure, ineffective, unenforced, as well as unenforceable. 317 The postmodern 
label creates the possibility of simultaneous success and failure or, at a minimum, 
an acknowledgment that success and failure are subjective and relative judgments 
dcpending on the actor's viewpoint.318 
The subject matter of data privacy regulated by the Safe Harbor Agreement 
fits the characteristics of postmodernism as well. Postmodernism rejects the 
concept of the autonomous lone or sole individual and instead emphasizes a 
social construction of the self.319 Under the postmodern definition of "self," data 
privacy is intimately connected to the construction of the self.320 What one buys, 
browses, and writes about through the Internet are manifestations of a person's 
being.321 The data collected about a person is arguably a reflection of the essence 
3" of that person. --
In addition, the term privacy itself has gostmodern traits because it suffers 
from an "embarrassment of meanings." 3 3 Privacy has been deemed a 
chameleon-like word,324 and concepts relating to privacy, particularly it"! 
American jurisprudence, are fluid and fragmented.325 Indeed, the United States 
grounds its approach to privacy in the concept of the "reasonable expectation of 
privacy.,,326 Expectations, however, are not static and are highly contextual.327 
Besides the subject matter, the Safe Harbor Agreement is intimately 
connected to high technology and the computer age. The concern for data 
privacy emanates from the ease of collection and proliferation of data that can be 
317. Steve R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy Directive and lnternational Relations, 
35 V~'ID. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 655, 681-82 (2002). 
318. One of the main purposes of the Safe Harbor Agreement was to prevent a showdown at the 
World Trade Organization; challenging the E.D. privacy directive as a restraint on trade-the trade 
in data. On this front the Agreement has been successful. This issue has not empted into a trade 
war. See Council Directive 95/46, pmbl. 'I:'\l56, 59, art. 25,1995 OJ. (L 281) 36-37, 45 (EC). 
319. See text accompanying supra notes 54-62. 
320. See text accompanying supra note 194-98. 
321. See Julia Gladstone, The U.S Privacy Balalice and the European Privacy Directive: 
Reflections on the United States Privacy Policy, 7 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Drsp. REsoL. 10, 17 
(2000). 
322. Id. 
323. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 D. PENN. L. REv. 477, 479 n.7 (citing KIM 
LANE SCHEPPLE, LEGAL SECRETS 184-85 (1988)). 
324. !d. at 479 nA (citing Lillian R. Bevier, Information about Individuals in the Hands of 
Government: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
455,458 (1995». 
325. Id. Daniel Solove proffers a taxonomy of privacy, categorizing and compartmentalizing 
the wrongs or torts relating to American concepts of privacy. Id. Interestingly, as Solove attempts 
to perform the modernist act of categorizing, he recognizes that privacy law is "fragmented and 
inconsistent." Id. at 562. See also Ann Bartow, Response, A Feeling of Unease about Privacy, 155 
U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 52, 53 (2006) (responding to Daniel J. Solove's A Taxonomy of 
Privacy) ("As So love expressly observes, privacy law is 'fragmented and inconsistent,' and it is 
unlikely to smoothly merge into a coherent whole even with So love's best efforts at taxonomy 
construction."). 
326. See Katz v. United Statcs, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
327. See Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 61, 66-67 (2000). 
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stored, processed, and retrieved by computer and through the Internet.328 Much 
of this data collection is for the purpose of tracking consumer preferences, 
targeting products, and marketing to individuals.329 
The Safe Harbor A9reement also has regulatory content that is available only through the Internet. 30 American companies seeking to avail themselves of 
the protections of the law must visit the U.S. Department of Commerce 
website.331 At that site, a company can find the latest mechanisms for registering 
and the current data protection guidelines.332 The law goes outside of the text 
found in the Federal Register and is contingent on the ephemeral text on the 
Internet.333 
The postmodern character of the Safe Harbor Agreement reflects the fact 
that there is no clear consensus about how to regulate data privacy. The United 
States approach is arguably inefficient in that it does not provide for certainty and 
motivates inconsistent rcgimes of possible over-regulation in some sectors due to 
fear of lawsuit and under-regulation in other sectors where fear of suit is 
minimal. 334 A criticism of the B.U. Directive is that it is myopic. 335 Some 
commentators argue that it was drafted with the mainframe computer in mind and 
does not reflect-and in fact hinders-the more advanced technologies found in 
the age of personal computers and the Internet. 336 
The most generally accepted approach to protecting data privacy, at least as 
is the approach of most industrialized countries, is through comprehensive 
statutory regulation.337 In academic circles, and in the United States in particular, 
328. Id. at 65-66. 
329. Id. at 66-67. 
330. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission: 
Procedures and Start Data for Safe Harbor List, Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,534 (Sept. 19,2000); 
Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 
45,666 (July 24, 2000). See also Safe Harbor Documents, supra note 19. 
331. Welcome to Safe Harbor, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/doc_safeharborjndex.asp 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
332. See id. 
333. See id. 
334. See Olena Dmytrenko & Cara D. Cutler, Does Ukraine Need a Comprehensive Statute to 
'Control' Private Data Controllers?, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 31, 64 (2006). 
335. PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOL.:~ BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 50-51 (Brookings Institution 
Press, 1998). 
336. Id. at 56; Edward C. Harris, Personal Data Privacy Tradeoffi and How a Swedish Church 
Lady, Austrian Public Radio Employees, and Transatlantic Air Carriers Show that Europe Does 
Not Have the Ansvvers, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 745, 775-76 (2007). See also Michael A. Turner & 
Peter A. Johnson, Privacy Rights and Policy Wrongs: How Data Restrictions Can Impair 
Iriformation-Led Development in Emerging Markets (Ctr. on Global Info. Econ., Chapel Hill, 
N.C.), 2003, at 4 (stating that if certain nations were "to adopt a national privacy law comparable to 
the E.U. directive, the net effect on trade and investment stemming from business process 
outsourcing by foreign MNCs is likely to be negative"), available at http://www.infopolicy.org/ 
pdflild.pdf. 
337. See, e.g., Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission: 
Procedures and StaJ.1 Data for Safe Harbor List, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,534 (Sept. 19, 2000). 
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there is no such consensus. 338 Some scholars call for enhancement of tort 
doctrine to better regulate abuses of data privacy.339 Some treat privacy as a form 
of personal property. 340 Others look to contract law and the private market to 
regulate data privacy. 341 Some eschew traditional legal regulation of privacy 
altogether and claim that "code" or technological innovation will ultimately 
"protect" privacy as needed by society. 342 For example, one pair of scholars 
argues that developing countries may profit from using a less regulated or self-
regulated approach to securing data privacy, at least in the short-term, in order to 
develop their economies through the free flow of information.343 
Harmonizing the approaches to safeguarding data privacy taken by the 
United States and the European Union could eliminate the postmodern 
characteristics of the Safe Harbor Agreement. The demand is growing for a more 
comprehensive regime securing data privacy in the United States. 344 More 
modernist approaches, as offered by the E.U. Data Privacy Directive or the 
,----_._-----,--,. __ ._-----
338, See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note at 3 ("[T]he invisible hand of eyberspace is building an 
architecture <>. that makes possible highly efficient regulation."); Dmytrenko & Cutler, supra note 
334, at 56 ("American data protection law largely evolved in the absence of statutory language."); 
Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1251 (1998) 
(stating that law and economics should regulate the protection of data privacy); Sarah Ludington, 
Reining in the Data Traders: A Tortfor the Misuse of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 
146 (2006) (suggesting use of common-law tort actions to resolve issues surrounding data privacy); 
Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 
GEO. L.l 2381, 2393 (1996) (assigning property rights "to personal information to the party who 
uncovers the information, rather than to the party whom the information concerns"); Pamela 
Samuel, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1131 (2000) (stating that people 
should have property rights in their personal data). 
339. See Ludington, supra note 338, at 146. 
340. See LESSIG, supra note 224, at 3; Murphy, supra note 338, at 2393. But see Samuel, supra 
note 338, at 1131 (stating that the property rights in personal information should belong to the party 
who finds the information). 
341. See Kang, supra note 338, at 1251. 
342. LESSIG, supra note 224, at 143. See also Todd M. Wesche, Reading Your Every Keystroke: 
Protecting Employee E-Mail Privacy, 11. HIGH TEcH. L. 101, 116-18 (2002) (discussing Lessig's 
proposal to use computer code to combat privacy issues). 
343. Dmytrenko & Cutler, supra note 334, at 56 (citing CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA 
PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS 124 (2003». See also DHONT, ASJNARl, & POULLET, supra 
note 258, at 85 ("The free flow of data after adherence was identified by the lawyers as one of the 
main advantages of [the Safe Harbor Agreement]."). 
344. See Daniell Solove & Chris Jay Hoofuagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 
U. ILL. L. REv. 357. Senators Patrick Leahy and Alen Spector introduced the Personal Data 
Privacy and Security Act of 2005, presenting a comprehensive set of proposals concerning the 
protection of personal data. See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, lO9th 
Congo (2005). See also Barnes, supra note 254, at 196 (quoting The European Union Data 
Directive and Privacy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th Congo (1998) 
(statement of Marc Rotenberg, Director, Electronic Privacy Information) ("The [E.U.'s Privacy 
directive] is ... 'a reminder that our privacy laws are out of date and that there is much work to be 
done ... to ensure the protection of [consumer privacy]. "'»); Allen Shoenberger, Privacy Wars: EU 
versus US: Scattered Skirmishes, Storm Clouds Ahead, 17 IND. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 355, 393 
(2007) (discussing how European privacy regulatory systems "contemplate far more privacy than is 
typical in the United States'} 
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proposed Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, would move both the 
Safe Harbor Agreement and U.S. data privacy law away from its postmodern 
character. 345 The benefits to a more modernist approach to regulating data 
privacy is that a modernist approach allows for control over an area of the law 
that currently has no coherent regulation. Allowing the conflicting and flexible 
postmodern approach to continue may close the opportunity to gain control and 
understanding over data privacy.346 
The postmodern characteristics of the Safe Harbor Agreement are, arguably, 
the reasons for its current success and, simultaneously, its disappointments. The 
fragmented and illusive character of data privacy law in the United States can 
make a law such as the Safe Harbor Agreement one form of law or legal regime 
to regulate privacy in the post-industrial age. 347 Its postmodern characteristics 
make it suited to the rapidly changing technologies that affect privacy protection 
at a time when no other forms of law find acceptance among the variety of 
communities subject to regulation. 
VI. CONCLUSION: POSTMODERNISM AS A WAY "To PAINT A MOVING TRAIN" 
One government official described negotiations between the United States 
and the European Union over data privacy as "trying to paint a moving train.,,348 
The law developed by the U.S. and E.U. data privacy agreement accomplishes 
this apparently unachievable project because it is postmodern. A postmodern law 
can perform certain normative functions that an otherwise modern law cannot. 
By being flexible, fragmented, and connected to high technology, it becomes a 
_ .... _-_ ... _------_ .. _-_ .. _-_._---
345. In early 2007, Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced the Personal Data Privacy and 
Security Act of 2007, intended to "ensure privacy, to provide notice of security breaches, and to 
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Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S,B. 495, 110th Congo (2007). Thc law would require 
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348, John Mogg, director general of the B.U. internal market stated that trying to regulate U.S. 
financial data would be like "painting a moving train" because U,S. legislation was in the process 
of being written and enacted. Graham Lea, US-Europe Privacy Deal: Agreeing to Ignore It?, THE 
REGISTER, Mar. 16, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.ukl2000/031l6/useurope _privacL deal_ 
agreeing!. See also Rebecca Sykes & Elizabeth de Bony, EU-US. Privacy Deal Rotten, 
Observers Say, NETWORK WORLD FUSION, Mar. 15, 2000, http://wV\<w.networkworld.com!news/ 
2000/0315rotten.html (describing the efforts to establish privacy restriction laws in the United 
States that adequately comply with those in the B.U. as "an exercise in futility"), 
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law that, while rife with paradox and irony, perf011TIS a function, bridges the 
modern and postmodern, and is apt for the postmodern era. 
The label postmodern is also a fitting and useful label for law emanating 
from high technology and the Internet that is inapposite under modernist notions 
of law. Computer code fits the characteristics of such a law because it regulates 
conduct within the high technology found in computers. But code also maintains 
the characteristics ofpostmodernism in its illusive and ephemeral quality. 
In the same way a product like a law emanating from modern times mirrors 
the broader culture of the modern era, a postmodern law reflects our postmodern 
era. Postmodernism helps us understand the patterns of thought that are 
emerging in this technological era. Using postmodem as a label advances this 
understanding of the law and jurisprudential theory. Trying to create a modem or 
normative law in an area subject to rapid technological or other change can be 
like trying to "paint a moving train." Using postmodern as a label can achieve 
this seemingly impossible task. 
